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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The most striking features of American industry in the 
twentieth century have been the rapid spread of the corporate 
form of business organization and the steady growth of "big 
business". Along with these have come important changes in the 
character and extent of competition and the development of 
particular price and production policies by the many different, 
large, influential industrial concerns. The activities of these 
powerful business organization~ have had significant effects 
upon economic thinking. Efforts have been made to reformulate 
economic theory in the light of what has been termed nimperfect11 ( l ) . 
or "monopolistic competi tion11 • Contemporary economists are 
concerned with securing a closer approximation to the operations 
of modern business. These reformulations have opened up new 
avenues of approach to economic problems. 
As yet, however, the stage has not been reached where a 
completely satisfactory explanation of business activity in our 
capitalistic system has been made possible by such analysis. 
This is due somewhat to the varied and hybrid nature of the 
extent of imperfection and the monopolistic structure existing 
among important industries in our economy. There exists a whole 
range of forms of competition such as cut-throat competition, 
( 1 ) • Two well known works in this direction are: 
E. H. Chamberlin, Th~ory of Monopolistic Competition 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1933. 
Joan Robinson, The Economics of Im~erfect Competitio , 
Macmillan, London, 1934. 
, 
oligopoly, duopoly, and near monopoly. S!bme examples are; the 
high degree of competition in the cotton textile industry, the 
construction industry which includes organizations ranging from 
monopolistic competition to local monopoly, the oligipolies in 
the automobile and cigarette industries, the tin can industry 
which is practically a duo~oly,, and the glass container and shoe 
( ~) 
machinery industries which are very close to complete monopoly. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to present and analyze 
those aspects of the organization, marketing and manufacturing 
activities of the United Shoe Machinery Corporation, together 
with the character and extent of its competition, which have a 
bearing on its price and production policy. Since the activi-
ties of the United Shoe Machinery Corporation (also known as 
USMC for abbreviation) in a very large part determine the 
structure of the shoe machinery industry, it is hoped that this 
thesis will make some contribution towards an understanding of 
that industry, especially as an example of the setting for the 
operation of a fairly advanced form of monopoly. 
This thesis will be limited to a discussion of USMC's shoe 
machinery business and will exclude any study or analysis of its 
manufacture and sale of tanning machinery or shoe factory 
supplies. These merely represent an extension of USMC's policy 
to be able to offer anything in the line of or connected with 
shoe manufacturing and follow the same basic pattern as USMC's 
price and production policy in regard to shoe machinery. 
( 2. ) • Hamil ton, Walton H., The Pattern of Competition, 
New York, 1940. pp. 17-52. 
In the shoe machinery field USMC has attained such a 
'· 
dominant position that is equalled by few other industries in 
the United States. The situation in the glass container.indus-
o 
try is somewhat the same and offers some interesting comparisons 
such as the method of patent control and licensing the use of ( .3 ) 
machinery to glass container manufacturers. In.the tin can 
industry there are also some monopolistic practices that are 
similar to those employed by USMC, · 
USMC secured its strong control of the manufacture of shoe 
machinery in the historic merger in 1899 of the Goodyear, McKay, 
Consolidated & McKay companies and has maintained it zealously 
ever since. The events.leading to US1VIC's formation, its 
structural organization and functioning are described in Chapter 
One. An important aspect of USMC's business policy to strength-
en its position is its acquisition program. The advantages 
secured by USMC by this program are explained since they have 
important effects upon USMC's control of the shoe machinery 
industry. 
In Chapter Two the nature of the shoe machinery business is 
explained. Some aspects of shoe making, the kinds of shoe 
machinery used by shoe manufacturers and the extent of their use 
is developed in summary fashion. The classification of shoe 
machinery into major and minor machines is explained as well as 
USMC's dominant position and its share of the market in these 
(3 ). Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation 
of Concentration of Economic Power, Monograph 31, Patents and 
Free Enterprise, Washington, 1941. 
fields. Some attention is given to the impact of inventions and 
technological improvements on the shoe industry, and the relianc 
of shoe manufacturers upon USMC machines. Helpful material in 
this chapter has been s~cured from the evidence presented by the 
~nited States Department of Justice in its recent suit against 
. ( 4- ) 
the USMC. 
The character and extent of USMC's competition is analyzed 
in Chapter Three. Some interesting methods and practices 
employed by USMC to fight and forestall competition are presentee. 
~ost of the competitive machines and companies offer only fringe 
competition. The major exception occurs in the cement shoe fieli 
where the Compo Shoe Machinery Company was able to initiate a 
~uccessful ma.chine which lasts the bottom of the shoes by a 
.cementing process that has gained much headway ~ince 1930. Even 
P,ere, after a belated start, USMC has succeeded in capturing ova:> 
~ifty percent of the business. The competitive effects of USMC's 
~cquisition program and its restrictive agreements are discussed. 
rhe competitive situation in the major and minor shoe machinery 
Pields is analyzed and statis~ical data is given bearing. upon 
~his topic. Since most every shoe manufacturer has to rely to 
some extent upon USMC machinery, this situation has enabled USMC 
"o use it as a bargaining weapon in restricting the installation 
( 4 ) . United States of America v. United Shoe Machinery 
borporation, civil actionNo. 7198, in the United States District 
Pourt for the District of Massachusetts. Trial Brief for the ~nited States filed May 2, 1949. This case is still in court. 
~t the time of the writing of this thesis the United Shoe 
[achinery Corporation is presenting its answer to the complaint. 
of competitive machines. USMC also has a stronghold over shoe 
manufacturers through the enforcement of ce~tain clauses in its 
lease contracts. 
USMC's price policy is analyzed in Chapter Four. The leasin1 
and rental system forms the most important base for the prices 
and terms given out by USMC, since its annual revenue from shoe 
machinery is derived mainly from this source. This system was 
originated by Colonel Gordon McKay in the 1860's and it has 
since been adopted by all the major shoe machinery companies, 
including USMC. Important factors which influence.USMC's price 
policy are; the extent of competition it faces, the dependence 
of shoe manufacturers upon USMC machines, due partly to the 
highly competitive nature of the shoe industry, and partly to 
the large number of small companies in the industry which were 
able to enter only because of the leasing system, and the effect 
of potential competition. 
USMC's production policy is taken up in Chapter Five •. The 
~in objectives of this policy seem to be the manufacture and 
distribution of a full line of shoe machinery and accessovies, 
aided immeasurably by main:taining a large research division 
~hich not only develops new machinery and improvements, but also 
provides the means whereby USMC can secure extensive patent 
~rotection for its existing machinery, and the production of a 
large stock of spare parts to replace those which are worn out, 
broken, or lost in USMC machines leased out to shoe factories. 
By these policies and business practices USMC has reached 
a dominant position in the shoe machinery field. 
Under the impetus given by recent interpretations_: of -the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act and with new bases for court action the 
Department of Justice has filed a complaint against the USMC in 
the District Court of Massachusetts, May 2, 1949. 
One of the important complaints made by the Department of 
Justice against USMC 1 s production policy has been its restrictia: 
and shelving of technological im~rovements. Once it has secured 
patent -control of an invention or improvement, USMC seems to 
have lost interest in commercializing it to any extent unless 
active competition stimulates it to do so. 
Many of its machines outstanding today are from twenty to 
thirty years old. This means that much of USMG's manufacturing 
has to do more with the replacement of parts, and making repairs 
rather than meeting new demands for machinery or manufacturing 
new types of machines. USMC 1 s leasing and rental system is 
closely tied up with this aspect of its production policy. 
The evidence presentyd by the u.s. Government in its trial 
~riefs have been the main source of material used in this thesis 
Two books that have been helpful in outlining the main develop-
~ent of this thesis were, "Structure of American Industry" by 
Nalter Adams, and 0 Price and Price Policies" by Walton Hamiltqn 
and associates! I have used John Due's, "Intermediate Economic 
Analysis" for ref-erence to recent economic theory upon monopoly, 
~nd competition. Harold Quimby's, 0 Pacemakers of Progress" and 
Edgar M. Hoover's 9 Location Theory and the Shoe Industryu were 
the main sources for many details regarding the relation between 
the shoe trade and the shoe machinery industry. 
6 
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CHAPTER I 
THE UNITED SHOE t~CHINERY CORPORATION 
AS A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
THE UNITED SHOE WiACHINERY CORPORATION 
AS A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
The United Shoe Machinery Corporation as it exists today is 
a powerful business organization dominating the shoe machinery 
industry to the extent.of controlling over 90% of the production 
in this field. Ever since 1899 when the United ShQe Machinery 
Company was formed by the merger of the three major shoe machin• 
ery companies of that time, it has maintained its monopolistic 
position by certain policies, practices and methods which will 
be discussed in this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis. 
In 1899 the three most prominent shoe machinery companies 
in the United States were the McKay Shoe Ma.chinery Company, the 
Goodyear Shoe M~chinery Company, and the Consolidated & McKay (5) . 
Lasting Machine Company. The control of this latter company 
~as secured by Sidney W. Winslow, Sr. and George Brown and it 
was the United Shoe Machinery Company.:t s most direct and immedi-
ate-,. parent. On February 7, 1899, with Sidney W. Winslow, Sr. as 
the main promoter, representatives of the three companies got 
together and founded the United Shoe Machinery Company (later 
changed to the United Shoe Machinery Corporation) in New Jersey 
with a capitalization of 25 million dollars. (later expanded to 
(' ) 
50 million dollars). 
(~). Quimby, Harold R., Pacemakers of Progress, Hide and 
Leather Publishing Co., Chicago, Ill., 1946, p. 46. 
(' ) • Standard & Poor, Corporation Records, Volume XII, No. 9, 
Februar:v. 1951. p.993. 
~-
Upon its formation the United Shoe Machinery Company· 
acquired most of the capital stock, business, and assets of the 
Consolidated and McKay Lasting Machine Company, McKay Shoe 
Machinery Company, Goodyear Shoe Machinery Company, ·and Eppler 
Welt Machine Company, each of which was engaged in the manu-
facture and distribution of shoe machinery in the United States. 
The purpose of the merger was to realize 8 the great advantages 
to be secured by the control in one corporation both in the 
United States and foreign countries of the efficient types of ( 7 ) . 
shoe machinery." The effect of the merger was to consolidate 
in one organization the companies manufacturing practically all 
the welt sewing, outsole stitching, lasting, metallic fastening, 
and heel-attaching machines then being manufactured and distrib-
. ( i ) 
uted in the United States. As the other independent shoe 
machinery companies were relatively small and insignificant, the 
new corporation was born a virtual monopoly with control of 95% 
(9) 
of the market. Since the merger USMC has continued to manu-
facture and distribute shoe machines of the types manufactured 
by its constituent companies to supply the demand of the shoe 
manufacturers, and also has extended its business to the manufa-
ture and distribution of numerous other types of machines, with 
the purpose of establishing the production of a full and com-
( 7 ) . From a circular sent to stockholders of· the Goodyear 
Shoe Machinery Company at the time of the merger •• ( 8 ) • These processes are explained in Appendix A -
Glossary of Terms. 
( CJ ) • For the sake of convenient abbreviation the capital 
letters USMC will be used for the remainder of the thesis to 
designate the United Shoe Machinery Corporation. This corpora-
tion itselr uses these letters Wid.ely as its trademark. 
plete line of shoe machinery. At present, USMC manufactures and 
distributes all types of major shoe machinery~ except upper 
stitching machines~ and all types of minor shoe machines of 
. ( /0) 
importance. 
Ever since its incorporation USMC has conducted a vigorous 
campaign to secure and maintain the major share of the market 
for shoe machinery. By obtaining a stranglehold on as many 
patents as it can get~ it has succeeded in forestalling competi-
tion in that respect. USMC also has entered into restrictive 
agreements with other manufacturers and has limited their entry 
into the shoe machinery field. 
Program of Acquistions 
Through the use of its strong position and its great pur-
chasing power USMC has been able to acquire the assets, includ-
ing machinery~ patents~ and plant equipment, of competitors~ and 
also has followed the practice of employing the inventbrs and 
key men of competitive shoe machinery companies. In this manner 
USMC has eliminated a good deal of existing, as well ~s poten-
tially effective,competition as well as extending its control 
over the shoe machinery industry by the acquisition of such ( II J 
assets and inventive skills. Total competition has thus been 
limited to very narrow fields. 
(!D). The classification of shoe machines as major and 
~inor is explained in Chapter II. 
( f/). Trial Brief for the United States, U.S. v. United ~hoe Machinery Corporation, Boston, Mass., May 2, 1949. Part I, 
tpp. 136-137. 
/0 
Some selected examples will show how USMC has helped to 
build up its present organization and has secured other advan-
tages from acquisitions. 
General Shoe Machinery Company 
The General Shoe Machinery Company was formed in 1917 by 
certain shoe manufacturers, including In~ernational Shoe Company 
the largest manufacturer of shoes in the United States, to 
engage in the shoe machinery business in competition with (12.) 
USMC. During the period from 1917 to 1923 General engaged in 
the development of a number of major machines,and in the manufao~ 
ture and sale of certain-minor machines, principally treeing and 
finishing machines. By 1922, major machines of General were 
being used successfully for the manufacture of shoes,and were 
(/3) 
ready for commercial exploitation. 
·-. 
However, in 1922, General Shoe Machinery Company. encounter-
ed the difficulty of lack of money and sought the aid of some 
backers who had helped it before. At about the same t~me, USMC 
was required by the judgment in the Clayton Act case to delete 
from its leases certain clauses found to be unlawful. To placa~ 
shoe manufacturers, USMC consulted them before issuing its 
revised leases and apparently satisfied them that the provisions 
which they had considered too onerous would be removed. As a 
result,. those shoe manufacturers who were backing the General 
( 12.) • Ibid. 
(13). Complaint, Dept. of Justice, u.s. v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corporation. Boston. Mass. DecembA.Y<t!=i. 1QA.'i' ............ .,., lo 
II 
Shoe Machinery Company lost interest in it, and so it was con-
eluded that this company would have to be sold to USMC. 
( 14) 
Here can be seen a good example of how the USMC managed to 
discourage a competitor from continuing business and by the 
purchasing power of its large capital resources secured patents 
on shoe machinery and employed one of the competitor's keymen, 
its principal inventor. 
Reece Shoe Machinery Company 
USMC followed approximately the same policy in acquisitions 
from the Reece Shoe Machinery Company, a subsidiary of the Reece 
Buttonhole Machine Company, which was engaged during the period 
between 1911 and 1934 in the shoe machinery business in compe-
ti t'ion with USMC. During this period the company developed and 
~arketed clicking machines and various minor machines and was 
engaged in developing and attempting to commercialize lasting, 
(IS) 
outsole s.ti tching, and welt sewing machines. 
To fight this competition USMC brought suit against Reece 
ifor infringement of one of USMC's patents which related to the 
( /6) ~se of a light alloy striking arm on the clicking machine. 
~his was the most successful machine in the Reece line. As of 
~arch 2, 1931, Reece had sold 791 of its clicking machines of 





Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., p. 139. 
Complaint, op. cit., p. 12. 
USMC vs. E. H. Ferree Co., 60 F. 2d 267. 
Trial Brief. Part I. op. cit •• p. 155. 
Ill-
By May, 1933, Reece was ready to negotiate a complete 
settlement of the differences between them and USMC, but the 
latter, having prevailed in its suit up to that point, adopted 
(18) 
a disinterested attitude. 
In 1934 USMC acquired for the sum of $55,000 all assets of' 
the Reece Shoe Machinery CompanJ~ except those used in the manu-( lrt) ; 
facture of clicking machines. These assets included all 
patents, models, and plant equipment used in the construction of 
the 2asting, outsole stitching, and welt sewing machinery which 
the Reece Shoe Machinery Company was then engaged in developing 
for commercialization. In 1935 the Reece Shoe Machinery Company 
was consolidated with its parent company which at all times 
thereafter has confined its shoe machinery business to the 
( ,2.()) . 
manufacture. and sale of eli eking machines. 
This acquisition shows how USMC limited the competition of 
an active shoe machinery company by using the pressure of a 
patent infringement suit. USMC aiso secured valuable assets 
including patents, models, plant equipment, and the rights to 
some important machines. 
C.C. Blake, Inc. 
C.C. Blake, Inc., was engaged during the period from about 
1913 to 1932 in the development of automatic shoe machinery and 
succeeded in obtaining patents upon, and in constructing 
(I~)" ( 1'1 ) • 
(~). 
Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., p.l55. 
Complaint, op. cit., p. 13. 
Ibid. 
13 
experimental models of such machinery, including automatic welt 
sewing, outsole stitching, lasting, rough round~ng, and ( ,.,, ) 
channelling machines. 
After 1917, USMC kept a careful check upon patents issued 
to the c.c. Blake, Inc., in the automatic shoe machinery field. 
In 1924, USMC negotiated with the c.c. Blake, Inc., for the pur-
chase of the Blake patents relating to automatic shoe machinery, 
t did not come to any final agreement. In 1932, however, USMC 
cquired all the assets, including shoe machinery patents of the 
company,for $15,000 and engaged its principal inventor in its 
~ ,.1..) 
employ. The purpose of this acquisition was to eliminate the 
ossibility that some one else could acquire them. USMC ac~uir 
patents and various machines manufactured by Blake for his 
utomatic line of shoe machinery. USMC then retained one 
It has never com-n=~·VL.L~ne of each kind and junked duplicates. 
(~~) 
rcialized the automatic shoe machinery thus acquired. 
In this case, USMC secured patent rights and machinery by 
chase~enabling it to deter actual and potential competition 
instances junked the shoe machinery to pre-
from competing with USMC 1 s machines. 
( 7--1 ) • 
( ?.~). 
(~). 
Complaint, op. cit., p. 13. 
<J:~bicf.- .. :~- 'J' :::··:,I) .... '<i >l :~ ~':. 
Trial Brief,-Part I: op. cit., pp. 160-161. 
Littleway Process Company 
Another very important acquisition was that of the Little-
way Process Company. Here USiiiC spent a considerable sum to take 
over a competing concern and establish it as a subsidiary. 
Following is a summary of the transactions involving us:r.TC, 
Alexander Little and the Littleway Process Company. 
Little had developed and patented the Littleway process of 
lasting and outsole stitching using staple and lockstitch sole 
sewing machines, which were being used successfully by 1924 in 
the manufacture of shoes, and were sufficiently developed for 
commercialization. After negotions with Little for rights under 
the Littleway process, USMC reached a tentative agreement with 
him by December, 1923, and the terms were incorporated in a 
. (~-f) 
formal contract executed in March, 1924. 
The contract provided as follows: 
3 (a) That Little would cause to be incorpo-
rated a company to be known as the Littleway 
Process Company; 
(b) That Little would assign to.USMC 49% of 
the capital stock of the Littleway Process 
Company for the,;sum~ot; $1,000,000 and would 
hold the remaining 51% in escrow subject to 
a five-year option of. USMC to acquire said 
stock for the sum of $2,000,000; 
(c) That Little would assign all patents 
covering the Littleway process to the 
Littleway Process Company which would "there-
after engage in a business of licensing shoe 
manufacturers to use the process; 
(d) That Little would transfer to USMC his 
staple lasting and sole sewing machines, and 
patents and applications for patents upon 
such machines, and that USiviC would thereafter 
(~). Complaint, op. cit., p. 13. 
15 
engage in the manufacture and distribution 
of such machines; 
(e) That for a period of ten years Little 
would not engage in any business competitive 
with the L~ttleway Process Company or USMC. 
In 1927, USMC acquired from Little for the sum of 
$1,400,000 the remaining 51% of the stock of the Little-
way Process Company. 
Continuously since 1927 the Littleway Process 
Comp~ny has been engaged as a wholly owned subsidiary 
of USMC, in the business of licensing shoe manufacturers 
to use the Littleway process, and USMC has been the 
sole manufacturer and distributor of staple lasting 
and McKay lockstitch sole sewing machines used in this 
process. In 1946, over 50,000,000 pairs of shoes were 
staple lasted by the Littleway process_and over 
10,000,000 pairs were both staple lasted and stitched 
by this process. 0 (~S) 
The acquisition of the Littleway process was an important 
one for USMC, having proved to be a lucrative source of profits. 
Interestingly enough, it was largely because of USMCls desire to 
intain and protect this means of revenue that caused it to 
ld back from ini'tiating development and commercialization of 
shoe machines in the cement ·shoe field, even after it appeared 
that the Compo Shoe Machinery Company was becoming quite 
successful in its efforts to market cement shoe machines. 
Another reason ·for USMC's delay also was the feeling of its 
management that these machines were not worth exploiting. How-
ever, when USMC did.decide finally to enter this field it made 
pid strides forward to capture a large share of the market for 
cement shoe machines. 
(ZS). Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
Employing Key Personnel 
Another practice that was followed by the USMC was that of 
hiring the inventive skill of those men who had developed impor-
tant shoe machinery that constituted a competitive threat. By 
this means USMC eliminated such competition as well as strength-
ening its own organization. Such was the case when USMC acquira 
the patents and machines of Jacob s. Kamborian, who was an exec-
utive and part owner of the Northern Machinery Company, which 
manufactured hot plates and cement side lasting.machines. 
Another instance was that concerning Napoleon A. Monfils, who 
invented an excellent wood heel nailing machine. 
A brief exposition of the latter case will show how USMC 
operated to secure such men in its employ. 
A wood heel nailing machine had been developed by Monfils 
and was offered to the shoe trade on an outright sale basis. 
The Monfils machine was fully competitive with USMC's Alpha Wood 
Heel Nailer from the standpoint of quality and quantity of per-
formance. At, first, USMC tried to fight this competition by 
turning to its patent resources and notifying Monfils of some 
slight infringements. However he had quickly corrected this. 
PSMC then considered purchasing the machine but abandoned the 
idea because it was not protected by patents. Finally USMC 
!hired Monfils which resulted in the dissolution of the Monfils 
Shoe Machinery Company, and effective curtailment of the 
17 
distribution of the Monfils Wood Heel Nailer. {~~J 
Other Acquisitions 
Then in numerous other instances USMC acquired the complete 
line of machinery, patents and equipment used by a competing 
company, or purchased outright the main patents and machinery of 
a company so that the company practically ceased to be a compet-
itor. This was the case with the Fitchburg Engineering 
Corporation, the Barbour Welting Company, The Safety Utility 
Press, Inc., the Standard Spoe Tying Machine Co., the Naumkeag 
Buffing Machine Company, Economy Company, Barge Electric Shoe 
Cement Company and others. 
As a result of its acquisitions, USMC has gained valuable 
automatic machinery inventions from c.c. Blake Company, Reece, 
~lexander Little, Fitchburg Engineering Company and American 
Ishee Company. USMC's patent structure has been greatly strength 
ened by the acquisition of its staple side lasting and lock-
stitch method and machine patents from Little; a line of welt 
machinery patents from the General Shoe Machin~y Co., Reece, 
Blake, and Gimson; side lasting patents from Kamborian, and a 
(1-1) 
pumber of patents upon other machines. 
Through its acqu~sitions, USMC has. secured some shoe proc-
~sses and machines whicU it has been able to. commercialize with 
considerable success. The classic example has been the Littlew~ 
process and the companion lockstitch and staple side lasting 
Trial Brief, Part I, op. c~~., p. 171. 
fbid~ --no¥:2o5.;;.266;, ._) ___ . 
It 
machines. Likewise, Henne and Preo had distributed the first 
successful heel seat fitting machine which, after USMC purchased 
it, has been marketed to the trade as the USMC Heel Seat Fitting 
Machine, Model lA, and with some refinements as the USMC Heel 
Seat Fitting Machine, Model B. USMC has also placed in shoe 
factories large numbers of Lockett Crimping Machines and Barbour 
{~t) . 
Welt Tempering Machines. 
Through the purchasing power of its large capital resource~ 
USMC has bought up competitors, acquired inventions and machines 
for commercialization or for shelving according to its interest~ 
has secured the services of some of the best inventors and 
If 
executive personnel in the trade,and has maintained and 
strengthened its monopoly position in the shoe machinery industr • 
Structural Organization 
Most of USMC's shoe machinery is manufactured at its prin-
cipal factory at Beverly, Mass.; some is manufactured in facto-
ries of branches of·USMC; The Booth Brothers Company at 
J 
Rochester, New York; and the O.A. Miller Treeing Company at 
Plymouth, New Hampshire. 
USMC also manufactures many shoe factory supplies. Some of 
~hese supplies include cements, stains, and waxes, tacks, and 
~ails, wood heel blocks, shoe laces and trimmings, cutting dies, 
~yelets, box toe materials and celastic softeners. 
The Turner Tanning Machinery Co., a wholly owned subsidiary 
{ ?.;8) • Ihid; 
. ·.~ 
--- ? 
of USMC, manufactures tanning machinery at Peabody, Mass. and 
. . ( ~,) 
distributes it to tanners of shoe leather. 
USMC also engages in the manufacture and distribution of 
shoe machinery, shoe factory supplies and tanning machinery in 
foreign countries through foreign subsidiaries. Such subsid-
iaries do business in Argentina, Brazil, The United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Belgium; Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
($0) 
Finland, Union of South Africa, India and Australia. 
Functional Organization 
Chairman of the Board, 8. W. Winslow, Jr. and President 
A. W. Todd are USMC's chief managing executives. Vice-President 
J. F. Wogan is General Manager of the Company. USMC' s vast and 
varied business requires the additional help of Vice-Presidents 
Roberts, Todd, Palmer and Brown who are responsible for the 
daily conduct of its affairs. 
The business of USMC is oper'B.ted through five main 
departments. 
1. Commercial Departments. 
2. Research Division. 
3. Patent Department. 
4. Manufacturing Department. 
5. Foreign Department. 
Most important of .all from the standpoint of price policy 
is the Terms Committee which determines the charges and terms fo 
~SMC's shoe machinery. It is composed of representatives of the 
Commercial Departments, Research Division and The Foreign Dept. 
·:-: .. _·-(~)> Standard&Poor, op. cit., p. 993. 
(30). Ibid. 
This committee receives proposals from the operating 
departments and others concerning the establishment or modifi-
cation of terms upon USMC's shoe machines. Then upon the basis 
of the proposals the committee recommends adoption of specific 
terms to the President or the Executive Vice-President who 
rarely, if ever, fail to accept these recommendations. After 
the terms recommendation has been approved, it is entered in 
USMC's Terms Books, which catalogues the terms applicable to all 
of USMC-' s outstanding machines. When USMC establishes terms 
upon a new machine, this signifies that it has been officially 
uadopted0 and it then becomes ready for distribution. 
· Commercial Departments 
USMC's Commercial Departments are responsible for the 
distribution and servicing of USMC 1 s shoe m~ch~nes ·and supplies 
within the United States. They consist of: 
1. The Operating Departments.,.. 
2. The Department of Agencies. 
3. The Shoe Process and Shoe Construction Department. 
4. The Sales Department. ·-.._ 
5. The Clerical, Advertising and Personnel Department , 
~ Operating Departments 
The Operating Departments, located in Boston, are the 
Cutting Die, Eyeletting, Fitting Room, General, Littleway, 
Rubber Shoe, Cement Shoe, Goodyear, Lasting, and Pulling Over, 
Heeling and Metallic Departments. 
Each operating department has cHarge of that class of shoe 
machinery which is closely as.sociated with the name of the 
department. These departments are consulted by the Research 
Division concerning the development of new and improved shoe 
chines and they make recommendations to the Terms Committee 
relative to the terms upon which the shoe machines should be 
distributed. 
The head of each operating department prepares an annual 
aport summarizing the activities of the entire USMC organizati 
they affect machines in charge of the reporting department 
and the activities of competitors in the particular shoe machin-
ery field covered by the·reporting department. 
Department of Agencies 
The Department of Agencies has direct supervision over 
's Branch offices located in the various shoe manufacturing 
the U.S. Each branch office is staffed by roadmen 
repair USMC machines in the shoe manufacturing plants. The 
also perform the very important function of preparing written 
eports of all information concerning tJi:De· installatio~ of 
( 31 
competitive machines in the shoe factories which they service. 
hese reports are known as OMIR's (Outside Machine Installation 
eports) and serve as the basis for executive action by USMC in 
resp.ects. First; the executive board decides what 
ction can be taken to eliminate or suppress competition by 
(3/). The activit~es and reports of the USMC's roadmen are 
so important in forming the basis of USMC's policies as well as 
roviding much of the factual material that describe the 
competitive situation in the shoe mach~nery industry that a 
detailed explanation of their operations is given in Appendix-B 
to this thesis. 
patent infringement notices, restrictive a8reements,or through.·· 
purchase of the rights to the competing machine or company. 
Second, decisions are made which may modify USMC 1 s price and 
production policy to fight the competition. 
The Research Division 
.___ .;:...;..;;:.,;;;_~;;;.._;:,;;;;;; _...;.;;..,;;...;;;;;.;;;..;;.;;..;;;.;;;;; 
The Research Division,and the Research Laboratory Departmen , 
develop ideas for new and improved machines. Their ideas are 
translated into working machine models by the Shoe Machinery 
Development Department, while the Program Department exercises 
general supervision over research and development. 
The Research Division is staffed by inventors and skilled 
technicians who are responsible for carrying out the research 
and experimental wo~k necessary to develop new and improved shoe 
machinery to the point where such machines can be turned over to 
the Manufacturing Department for mass production. 
The Research Division often starts work on new machtnes or 
on developmental projects on the recommendation of the Operating 
Departments. When any new work is begun, the Patent Department 
is ·notified and is kept informed of all ensuing progress so that 
the Patent Department can secure patents upon inventions 
resulting from the development. 
Patent Department 
USMC 1 s Patent Department is composed of some twenty patent 
attorneys. As soon as the Research Division informs the Patent 
Department that a new development is under way, then an 
attorney is assigned to follow the development and to maintain a 
docket concerning it. The assigned attorney is expected to 
obtain all possible patents that can be derived from the devel-
opment. 
USMC's Patent Department also checks information concerning 
all reported competitive machine installations against USMC's 
patents to determine whether such patents are infringed by the 
competitive machines. If the Patent Department finds infringe-
ment it reports the fact to the,to~ management which determines 
' ' the further action to be taken. 
Manufacturing Department 
The Manufacturing Department has charge of USr,'J:C t s foundries 
machine shops and other production facilities at Beverly and is 
responsible for the quantity production of "USMC shoe machinery 
and supplies. This Department also scraps the used machines 
(3~) 
acquired by USMC or returned to it by lessees. 
Foreigg Department 
USMC manages its foreign subsmdiaries through its Foreign 
Department. To assist it in maintaining closer supervision over 
the European subsidiaries, the Foreign Department has set up an 
' (33) 
Administrative Department with offices in England. 
(3~). 
( 33). 
Trial Brie~~a£t I, op. cit., p. 16. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SHOE MACHINERY INDUSTRY 
THE SHOE MACHINERY INDUSTRY 
Early Developments 
For thousands of years up to the middle of the 19th century 
shoes were made by hand with the aid of simple instruments. The 
awl, the needle, the knife and the block were the principal 
tools used in creating footwear. Up until about 1850, there had 
been practically no introduction to mechanical processes. Then 
during the next fifty year~ a considerable number of shoe 
machines were invented, some very important and others merely 
incidental. 
During the later 1840's, the first sewing machines were put 
on the market, but it was not until 1860 that they became 
(I ) 
satisfactory for sewing anything heavier than cloth. /·otb.er 
inventions prior to the Civil War included pegging, skiving, and 
sole-cutting machinery. 
The David Knox sole-cutting machine, patented, May 5, 1855, 
was the start of a special branch of the shoe industry known as 
sole cutting. Before this time soles were cut or 0 dinked" out 
by hand after the sole leather had been tempered or dampened. 
This hand method had several disadvantages besides being costly• 
If the soles were not immediately attached to shoes they would 
~ecome moldy when laid away in piles. With the use of the Knox 
~chine, "dry cut" soles of any size could be purchased by shoe 
{/ ). Clark, VictorS., History of Manufactures in the U.S, 
Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1916, p. 468. 
makers and stored u~til they were needed.\~7 
Blake and the McKay Sewing Machine 
Then came the most important invention of all. This was 
the so-called McKay Sewing Machine, which solved the difficult 
problem of sewing soles to uppers mechanically, and was the 
first successful machine in this operation. It was named after 
Colonel Gordon McKay, ·who bought the patent rights from Lyman 
Blake and commercialized it in the early 1860's. Before the 
invention of this machine the essential method in shoemaking of 
fastening the sole to the upper had been accomplished by a 
variety of methods including the use of wood pegs, thread, nails 
wire screws, cements and other adhesives. 
The incidents concerning Lyman Blake, his invention, and 
the efforts of Colonel McKay to commercialize this machine form 
..... 
one of the most interesting passages in the history of shoe 
machinery. 
It seems that Blake had sold his patent to McKay for an 
(.3 ) 
amount which eventually came to about $60,000. Being of an 
enterprising nature, Blake then went to Virginia and opened up a 
general store, stocking it mainly with his ~p60,000r, After doing 
a good business for a short while, the Civil War descended with 
disastrous results for Blake. There he was, a Yankee, in the 
midst of Rebel territory. It is said that he just did manage to 
( ~). 
( .3 ) • 
Quimby, op. cit., p. 33. 
Ibid., p. 38. 
catch the last train leaving for the North out of Richmond. 
Appealing to Colonel McKay for help, Blake received the job of 
introducing his machine in England, which he did with such 
success that up to today the machine. is known there as the Blake 
Sewing Machine. Blake died in 1883 at the age of 48 as a result 
of hard work which had exhausted his energies. Today, millions 
of pairs of shoes are still made by the McKay process, which is 
the leading one in the manufacture of women's and children's 
shoes in the cheaper gradei. 
The really signifi canti.· use of power began with the McKay 
machine in tpe early 1860's and as late as 1869 there was a 
total installation of only 3069 horsepower in the country's shoe ( 4 ) 
shops. Difficult to mechanize, the shoe industry was also 
difficult to adapt to power machinery. Since most of the oper-
ations require very frequent starting and stopping, and must be 
under the perfect control of the operator, it is not surprising 
to find that practically all of the shoe machinery in use prior 
to the Civil War was operated by hand or foot power, and even 
(S'" 
today, many operations are still performed in such a fashion. 
The Goodyear Welt Sewing Machine 
In 1862 August Destouy of France originated the idea of a 
~elt sewing machine. It was not made practical, however, until 
1874 when Christian Danzel, working under the direction of 
( '1 ) • U. S. Census Data. 
·(f). Gras, N .. S.B., Industrial Evolution, Cambridge, Mass. 
tL 9 30' p • 1371. 
Charles Goodyear, Jr., made the first practical machine of the 
Goodyear welt type. He later also deve~oped a machine for sew-
~{., ) 
ing the t~rn· shoe. 
The welt shoe is so constructed that a welt or narrow strip 
of leather is used to join the outsole to the upper and is 
considered to be the highest type of shoemaking. This operation 
is done in such a manner that no stitches appear on. the surface 
of the insole, whereas the McKay process leaves exposed stitches 
on the inside of the shoe, which in all but the cheapest grade 
of shoe necessitates inserting a special sock lining to protect 
the foot. 
The adoption of welt shoe machinery at first proceeded 
quite slowly,being retarded by the greater cheapness of the 
McKay method, but from the 1880's on, the Goodyear machine came 
into use fairly rapidly. 
Other Shoe Machines 
Other shoe machines developed during this period were as 
follows:. 
About 1870 there was developed a screw bottoming machine 
which attached the soles by wire screws. This process is used 
. . $7) 
mainly on heavy boots and shoes. 
In 1870 came an improved heel building and attaching 
machine which was influential in increasing the number of pairs 
{~ ). Quimby, op. cit., Chapter XV. { 1 ) . Rice, William B., One Hundred Years of American 
Commerce, Volume II, p. 568. 
of heels attached by McKay and Bigelow heelers from ten million ( K ) 
in 1871 to 45 million in 1881 and 72 million in 1890. 
In 1874 o. A. Miller of Brockton, Mass. invented treeing 
machines for use in shoe factories in smoothing uppers and 
making shoes more presentable. This company is now a subsidia 
of the USMC. 
In 1882 J. E. Matzeliger invented a lasting machine which 
finally proved satisfactory in operation. In its initial form 
the Matzeliger machine increased the operator's output a dozen-
( ' ) fold. By 1900 machine lasting was the rule in Philadelphia 
nd New England except for custom work and turned shoes. 
USMC and Later Developments 
So with the invention and development of the various shoe 
chines there was at first a great number of companies, most of 
them very small and manufacturing but one type of machine. But 
then there was a rapid tendency toward amalgamation much like 
in other.industries o;f' tljat time, notably in the steel and 
refining fields. In 1899 the three principal companies in 
machinery field; the McKay Shoe Machinery Company, the 
Sewing Machine Company and the Consolidated and McKay 
sting Machine Company combined to form the United Shoe 
chinery Company, later changed to the United Shoe Machinery 
This merger involved considerable elimination of 
( f ) . Washburn, C •. G., Industrial Worce.ster, Worcester, 
ss., 1917, pp. 244-246. ( 1 ) . Associated Industries of Mass., Industry, Boston, 
Volume I 63. 
duplicate agencies and repair gangs, and combined many of the 
patent rights for shoe machinery. So it was motivated partly b~ 
consideratio~ of internal economy as well as seeking to form a 
trust. 
The principal machines which each of the independent 
companies featured were closely tied up with one another in a 
link process of manufacturing shoes and formed the very impor-
tant basis for securing control of and being able to offer a 
full line of shoe machinery. 
The Tying-in Clause 
USMC from its inception had control of something like 95% 
of the shoe machinery markey and has acquired the rights to most 
of the important inventions and·improvements which have been 
developed since then. Most of these acquisitions have been 
discussed in Chapter I. At first,one of the important ways by 
which it maintained its control over the supply of essential 
machines long after the patent rights had expired was by means 
of tying clauses. If a shoe manufactuDer wanted to use a 
lJpecific USMC machine, he was forced to contract for the use of 
othsr USMC machines,also,where competing machines were on the 
market. Thus the manufactuDer was faced with the choice of 
taking the whole USMC line or no' part of it. Since practically 
every shoe manufacturer had to use one or more USMC machines 
they found that the path of least resistance was the acceptance 
of the USMC line-of-machines. 
Reliance of Shoe Manufacturers on USMC Machines 
Even though USMC was forced to relinquish its use of the 
tying-in clause in contracts with shoe manufacturers by a 
. 3/ 
Supreme court decree under the Clayton Act in 1922, this decisio~ 
did not materially affect the reliance of shoe manufacturers on 
USMC machines. 
Modern shoe making is largely dependent upon the use of 
machinery. Their use results-in labor saving and increased 
production. In order to compete successfully in the market, 
shoe manufacturers must utilize a variety of machines, most of 
which are produced by USMC. Shoes are made on the principle of 
one machine to each operation. This situation has been care-
fully fostered and maintained by the USMC to force reliance of 
shoe manufacturers upon USMC•s products in as many ways as 
possible. This practice combined with the leasing and royalty 
system has provided the main source of USMCTs annual revenue 
besides enabling it to maintain an influential position over 
shoe manufacturers. 
Since about 1900 the noticeable improvements in shoe 
machire ry by USMC have resulted in a swifter device to accom-r 
plish the same operation that was once done by hand or a slower 
machine. There has been a decided lack of commercialization of 
!machines by USMC which will combine two or more of the hundreds 
pf st~ps in t~e shoe making process. This practice forms an 
~ntegral part of USMC 1 s production policy and has had important 
effects in determining and shaping the structure of the shoe 
machinery industry, not to speak of its influence upon the 
nature and methods of shoe manufacturing. 
Shoe Machinery Developments Since 1900 
Since 1900 practically every development of significance in 
shoe machinery is in one way or another tied up with the activ-
ities of the USMC. 
The notable exception has been the successful development 
and introduction of improved cement shoe lasting machinery by 
the Compo Shoe Machinery Company. This company has become the 
main competitor of USMC and yet its business is largely concen-
trated to· the production of machinery in one field, the cement 
shoe field. The activities of the Compo Shoe Machinery Company 
are discussed more fully in Chapter III as competition to USMC. 
The more important developments and their relationship to 
USI!IC are as follows: 
(a) About 1909 the clicking machine which is still in 
great use by USMCts customers today was constructed by a Mr. 
Bates of England. After securing the patent rights to this 
~achine USMC produced over 16,000 of these machines which (/0) 
represents more than 97% of the t?tal. J Practically all of 
these machines are still being used, many of them being very ol~ 
(b) From 1917 until 1924 the A. E. Little Company of Lynn, 
.. ~ass.· developed and patented a method of shoe ma:p.ufacturing, and 
machines to be used by this method, are known as the Littleway 
\ 
\ 1° '• Tria~ Br~ef, U:• S ~ ~. U:~MC, ,Boston, ~iay, 1949, 
Part (I. )p. 27~•' ~ -· .. -~ .. ·: . ~- , ., ~'..L. ~. , .• 
process. \II 1 The company was organized by Alexander E. Little 
but the inventive work was done by J.H. Eeed and Phillip Bowen. 
The process consisted essentially of a lockstitch sole sewer 
with a horn attachment which sewed inside the shoe, and a last 
stapling machine with a staple so constructed that the point 
would curve within the innersole and not break through. USMC 
recognized the worth of this process as well as the serious 
competi.tive threat it offered.- Therefore it carried on a series 
of negotiations with Little for the purchase of the rights to 
this process and the control of a new company to be called the 
Littleway Process Company. Little was paid $1,000,000 in 1924 
as a first payment and an additional $1,400,000 in 1927 to 
complete the transfer. 
Under the ownership of USMC the Littleway process and its 
machine proved to be very successful and profitable. The 
Littleway staple side laster became an important source of 
revenue to USMC. It was the lucrativeness of this process as 
well as USMC's investment 'in.~i.ji,that played a large part in the 
reluctance of USMC to go all out in the production of cement 
sole attaching machines in order to compete with the Compo Shoe 
(/J,.) 
!:1achinery Company. 
(c) In 1928 t.he Compo Sboe Machinery Company put out the 
first successful cement shoe machinery on the market for the 
shoe industry in the United States. This company was able to 
get a good start in the field chiefly because USMC officials 
-, -




~elt that the cement shoe< I~ Jwas a aflash in the pah0 and not 
(J4) 
~ikely to become very popular. 
Description and Classification of Shoe Machinery 
In order to analyze the situation in the shoe machinery 
industry in regard to the types of machines manufactured and 
distributed by USMC and its competitors, and to present share 
pf the market studies, it will be necessary first to gain an 
~nderstanding of the shoe machines ordinarily used in the major 
~tepa in making shoes, and the relative importance of each 
machine. 






Cutting out the parts of the upper ahd soles. 
Stitching the parts of the upper together. 
Stitching the completed upper over a wooden form 
called the last, and tacking it temporarily.into 
posit:ion there. 
Attaching the soles to the upper. 
Each of these processes includes various major operations 
performed by machine. 
"In upper cutting.and stitching the parts of the 
upper are usually died out from leather and fabric by 
a clicking machine; and.are sewed together on an 
upper stitching machine. In most shoes eyelets are 
inserted by eyeletting machines. 
fDtock fitting involves the cutting and prepara-
tion of the bottom stock of the shoe. Insoles and 
outsoles are frequently cut on cutting presses, known 
in the trade. as dinking machines • 
The lasting of a shoe is one of the most impor-
tant; steps in shoe making. On most shoes it consists 
(13). Cement shoes are those in which the leather outsole 
s attached to the insole by cement. 
( 14). Trial Brief Part I on. cit n 2A~ 
of a series of operations in which the upper and ' 
lining are drawn over a wooden last and attached to 
the insole. The upper is.initially stretched bver 
and positioned on the last by a pulling over machine; 
a lasting machine then draws the upper over the last, 
conforms it snugly and smoothly to the profile of the 
last, and affixes it ~o the insole. Some lasting 
machines last the entire upper; others last only a 
_part of the upper, such as the sides, toe, or heel. 
Bottoming and making refer to the operations in 
which the outsole and heel are attached to. the shoe. 
The outsole is initially affixed to the insole by an 
outsole laying machine, the edges of the outsole are 
rounded and trimmed by a rough rounding machine, and 
the sole is ironed by an outside leveling machine. 
The ou tsoles, of all shoes, ex.cept welts, are permai"' 
. nently attached by McKay sole sewing, loose nailing, 
or cement sole attaching machines. In welt shoes the 
welt is sewed to the insole by a welt sewing machine, 
the upstanding rib and surplus upper margin below the 
welt stitching are trimmed off by an inseam trimming 
machine, and the outsole is stitched to the welt .by 
an outsole stitching machine. The part of the out-
sole to which the heel is attached, known as the heel 
seat, is usually fastened to the shoe by fibre fasten-
!Bg_or loose nailing machines, and heels are attached 
by heel attaching and slugging machines. 1l ( /d"') 
The shoe machines thus described will be referred to as 
major machines. In addition, there are numerous other machines 
used in shoe factories which are either auxiliary to major 
machines in the sense that their functions are immediately re-
lated to those of major machines, or they perform work indepen-
dent of that done by major machines but of somewhat·less impor-
tance in the shoemaking proqess. These will be referred to as ( ,, ) . 
minor machines. 
One convenient method of classifying shoes is through the 
~ethod by which the outsole is attached to the rest of the shoe. 
This method points out the ~elative importance of the use of 
u.s-). 
( /1#) • 
Complaint, "U".S. :..v •. ,ljS~.flC, ~oston, December, 1947,p.3. 
Trial Brief. Part I, op. cit.j pp. 20-21. 
different kinds of sole attaching shoe machinery. 
The three main classes are sewed shoes, cement shoes, and 
nailed shoes. In 1947 sewed shoes accounted for about 59% of 
the total number of shoes produced annually in the u. S., 
(17) 
cement shoes for about 38% and nailed shoes for about ~. 
The most important kinds of sewed shoes are the Goodyear 
Welt, McKay sewed, lockstitch, pre-welt and stitchdown. Good-
yea!' Welts include virtually all men's dress shoes, McKay sew.ed 
and lockstitch shoes are principally women's shoes. The stitch-
down and pre-welt like the Goodyear Welt, are constructed so 
that the inside of the shoe is not penetrated by stitchings. 
They are usually infants, childrea's and juvenile shoes. 
The soles of cement shoes are usually attached by pyroxlin 
cement. This shoe was first commercialized in the United States 
about 1928 and has since gained wide popularity. It is in this 
field that USMC has encountered its greatest competition, which 
comes from the Compo Shoe Machinery Company. Approximately 90% 
of all cement shoes are women's, and the main bulk of these 
consist of low-priced dress shoes,sandals, slippers, .. platform 
. ( 18) 
shoes, sport shoes and play shoes. 
Nailed shoes consist almost entirely of men's work shoes. 
Following on the next page is a ~able @f the percentages of 
total production of the various methods of shoe production~ and 
also a table showing the number of pairs of shoes attached by 
the various methods in 1946. 
(/f). Complaint, op. c~~., p. 2. 
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TABLE 1 
PRODUCTION OF SHOES BY METHOD OF SOLE ATTACHING 
IN PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL PRODUCTION 
(Selected Years) 
1919· 1929 1933 1946 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Goodyear Welt 42 37 32 30 
McKay Sewed 34 36 28 12 
rs tit chdown 11 16 14 
Cement 12 40 
Metallic 7 7 8 3 
Turn Shoe 17 9 4 1 
Source: 1919-1933, computed from Census Data, Census of 
Manufacturers, 1933. 1946 from Complaint, Dept. of Justice, 
U.S. v. USMC, December 15, 1947, Boston, Mass., p. 2. 
TABLE 2 
1946 SHOE PRODUCTION BY METHOD OF SOLE ATTACHING 
Method of Sole Thousands Percent Attaching of Pairs of Total 
~oodyear Welt 149,038 30.0 Stitchdown 59,176 11.9 
Pre-Welt 11,243 2.2 NrcKay Sewed 58,679 11.8 Cement 201,672 40.6 Nailed 13,798 2.8 Turn 3,493 0.7 
Total 497,099 100.0 
Source: Adapted from statistical table of Trial Brief, u.s. 
v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, Boston, Mass., May 2, 
1949, Part I, p. 72. 
37 
It can be seen from this data that the method of cementing 
soles has grown rapidly since 1929, while the methods of McKay 
sewing and Turn Shoe have declined appreciably. Even the field 
of ,Goodyear. Welt sole attaching has diminished in its percentage 
of production. The stitchdown method has been used about to the 
same extent since 1929. It then becomes apparent that the 
activities of the Compo Shoe W~chinery Company in cement able 
attaching have had a marked effect in the field of sole attach.;. 
ing in the shoe machinery industry. 
The competitive efforts of the C?mpo Company will be 
discussed in the next chapter on competition. 
Major Shoe Machinery and US]liC' s Share of tlree Market 
In discussing shoe machinery it is advisable to make some 
distinction between those machines which perform major operatic~~ 
in the shoe making process and others which perform operations 
of relatively iesser importance. This distinction is necessary 
because of the fact that hundreds of different machines are used 
in the several.hundred different operations presently required 
for manufacturing shoes. We can gain some idea of the comp~exit~ 
of the shoe machinery industry by noting that there are about 
554 different models which USMC now has out on lease, or has 
{If) 
sold far some time since 1930. 
In presenting its case against the USMC the government 
classifies major machines into eighteen fields which include 57 
(/f). Trial Brief, Part I., op. cit., p. 20. 
machine models offered by USMC. Also given is a table arranged 
in the order in which the major machines are used in the shoe 
machinery process, showing the number of each kind of USMC 
machine outstanding in footwear factories in 1947 and USMCts 
percent of the total amount of such machines. From this table 
it is apparent that USMC holds by far the greatest share of the 
market for each major machine except two, One of the latter is 
in the field of cement sble attaching where the Compo Shoe 
Machinery Corporation still retains a large share of the market. 
i 
In the other USMC has refrained from producing or distrib-
uting upper stitching machinery as a result of a restrictive 
(:1-0) 
agreement with the Singer Manufacturing Company. (See table 
page '10.) 
Minor Shoe Machinery and USMC 1 s Share of the Market. 
Not only are there a great number of minor machines on the 
market, but th~re exists a great variation in the types and 
importance of them. ·Minor machines range from types only 
slightly less important than the major machines to attachments 
or auxiliaries for other machinery, and even to some devices 
) ,; 
which can be called machines only under a very broad definition. 
Since the USMC also has a substantial share of the market 
in most of the minor machinery fields, its classification and 
~ description of the machines can be used as a good representation 
of the situation in the industry itself. 
(~). 
I ' 
. ··' . , 
I • . -. , 
Shoe Factory 
Department 
I. Upper Cutting 
II. Upper Fitting 





USMC MAJOR SHOE WlACHIHERY FIELDS 
SitARE OF THE MARKET 'ANALYSIS 
as of May 1, 1947 
Major 
Machine 
1. Clicking • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 •. Eyeletting • • • • • ., • • . • • 3• Cu±ting Press (Dinking). • • • • 4. Pulling Over • • • • • • • • • • 5, Lasting •• • • • • • • • • • • • 6. Belt Sewing • • • . • • • . . . 
7. Inseam Trimming • • • • • • • • 8. Outsole Laying • • • . . • . • . 9. Rough Rounding • • • • • • • • • 10. Outsole Stitching • • • • • • . 
11. Cement Sole Attaching. . • • . • 
12. Littleway Lockstitch • • • • • • 13. McKay Chainsti tch • • • • • • • 14. Loose Nailing • • • • . • • • • 15. Outsole Leveling • • • • • • • • 16. Fibre Fastening • . • • • • • • 17. Heel Attaching • • ... • • • • • 18. Slugging • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Total • • • . . . • . • • . • . 
USMC 
Machines USMC 
in footweE!.r per cent 
factories· of total 
• • 16,346 97 
• • 2,296 81 
• • 3,319 91 
• • 3,145 99 
• • 12,561 94 
• • 1,470 w 
• • 575 99 
. • 1,029 91 .. 
• • 1,430 98 
• • 3,537 92 
. • 870 40 
• 
.. 580 91 
. • 498 88 
• • 1,224 98 
• • 1,082 97 
• • 470 100 
. • 3,168 93 
• • 773 91 
--
• • 54,393 92 
Source: Trial Brief, U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, Boston, Mass., 
May 2, 1949, Part I, P• 25. 
~ 
On.page ,0, Chapter Three of this thesis, there is shown a 
table giving. US].W'";s sunnnary of minor machines, grouped into 
twelve operating depar.tments. Some departments have only a few 
machinery fields, or types of machines, while others may have 
as many as 54, in the General Department, and 26, in the Good-
year·Department. However, as has beem stated previously, some 
of these machines are much more important than others. USMC:t,s 
Fitting Room Department, for example, includes 18 minor machin-
ery fields. Three of the 18 fields, although accounting for 
only 22 per cent of US:MC's total number of Fitting Room Depart-
ment machines,· eafned 42 per cent of the Department's revenue 
in 1946. (1-/) 
A comparison between USMC•s major and minor machines both 
by the number of machines in each category and by the revenue 
received by. ~SMC from them is made in the following table. 
TABLE 4 
COMPARISON OF USMC 1S MAJOR AND MINOR MACHINES 
{year ending February 28, 1947) 
Machine Revenue - Share of USMC's Total 
Number of Machinery Fields 
Machine Types Elurrently Offered by USMC. 














Source: Trial Brief, U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corporaticn 
Boston, Mass., May 2, 1949, Part I, p. 112. 
From this table it can be s·een that there are about 7000 
(1-1). Ibid., p. 115. 
• 
re minor machines outstanding as of 1947 than major machines 
including 295 types as compared to 57 types of major machines, 
the total revenue for minor machines is less than one•third the 
revenue for major machines. 
However, even though the annual revenue secured from minor 
machines is much ie.ss than that secured from major machines. 
USMC 1 s minor machines have some effect upon USMC 1 s Price and 
Production Policy, especially when it is noted that USMC 
attempts to offer a full line of machinery and also ;f'ight 
competition as much as possible in all fields • 
42.. 
CF..APTER III 
THE CF~RACTER AND EXTENT OF COMPETITION 
IN THE SHOE :MACHINERY INDUSTRY 
THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF COMPETITION 
IN THE SHOE MACHINERY INDUSTRY 
The most important factor influencing USMC I s'"price and 
production policy at any particular time is the competiti~e 
situation it faces. As a result of USJ\IIC 1 s successful efforts 
in eliminating, restricting and forestalling competition in the 
~ast, the competition with which it now has to contend is rather 
limited, especially in the major machinery fields. The notable 
exception is the Compo Shoe Machinery Company and even here most 
pf its activities are concentrated on the production of one type 
pf machine, cement sole attaching. ~ 
"' 
Still, no matter how minute any competitive threat app'ears, 
JSMC becomes intensely concerne~ about it. In the past USMC has 
followed the price and production policy of radically curtailing 
~ts profits or even sustaining a loss in the distribution of 
~ertain types of. machines in order to foreclose the market to 
competitors. Another reason for such a policy is that USMC 
9eeks to maintain a full line of machinery to offer to shoe 
j:nanufacturers, thus keeping them all the more dependent upon 
~SMC's products. 
USMC's objective of developing, producing and-distributing 
~ full line of shoe machinery has often been stimulated or even 
~edirected by the installation of some new type of competitive 
~chine, or else by the entry of a new company in the shoe ma-
chinery field. In such an event.JUSMC follows a familiar pattern 
of action, one which ithas used consistently upon the aooearance 
of_a competitive machine in a shoe factory. First, the machine 
is kept under complete surveillance by USMC's roadmen and patent 
experts. Second, USMC 1 s management is kept fully informed of 
ctivities concerning this machine. Third, if the situation 
rants it, the competing company is notified that it has 
( I ) 
USMC's patents. Oftentimes this is done even 
the connection between the machine and USMC's patent is 
. ' -
If this does not bring satisfactory results then the 
research division will institute developmental work for a 
imilar machine or perhaps improve one of its existing machines. 
USMC may revise the terms on its machines which compete 
the competitive installation. All of these practices have 
put into effect from time to time as the occasion arose. 
Another way by which USMC has met competition was to enter 
nto restrictive agreements with those companies whose main 
siness was outside the shoe machinery business, but who 
in the.manufacture of certain machines which could be 
in the shoo trade. 
Therefore it becomes necessary to·examine the character and 
of the competition that USMC has faced and the results of 
activities against such competition. The concluding pages 
this chapter give a summary of the status of USMC and its 
etitors in 1947. 
Upon its formation in 1899 US1VIC'received the control of the 
iness and patent ri_ghts to most of the shoe machinery market. 
1949, 
4f. 
The Tying-in Clause 
At first USMC followed the practice of leasing its m.achiner, 
in groups; these groups usually comprising a basic machine 
accompanieli by accessory machines. If a shoe manufacturer wishec 
to lease an accessory machine of any group, then he also had to 
take the basic machine. This was known as the tying-in clause. 
This left little chance for the independent shoe machine maker 
to do much business, or to enter the field if he was able only 
to produce one or two machines. These machines were of little 
~se except in conjunction with other equipment. 
In 1915 the government brought suit against USMC under the 
Clayton Act to stop this practice. The suit dragged on until 
~922 when it was finally decided that USMC had to lease each 
~achine as a unit and that its contracts could not bind shoe 
tn.anufacturers to the lease or purchase of other machines. The 
~ffects of this decision did not affect USMC's position materi-
~lly because there was so little competition in the industry and 
~lso it had other means with which to meet any existing competi-
~ion. One of these means was its ability to purchase and acquire 
lthe assets, patent rights, _machines, equipment and key men of its 
bompetitors. Another was its abillty to induce companies which 
:nanufactured shoe maoh$2nery or shoe repair machinery or contem-
plated doing so to confine their business to machines which did 
tlot compete with USMC machines. USMC also entered into agreemenis 
~ith other companies by which USMC became the distributing agent 
F-or their shoe machinerv and in this w.a:v it: w~~ t:ih1P. t:n ,.v+:P.nr'! 'l+:b 
control over certain fields in the shoe machinery industry. 
Competitive Effects of USMC's Acquisitions 
Although USMC is now. the only company offering a full line 
of shoe machinery, there have been occasions in the past when 
other companies have produced a fairly wide variety of shoe 
~achinery or else they were developing an important line of 
machines in order to enter into competition with USMC. These 
have since ceased doing business either by reason of being 
acquired by USMC, being eliminated from business, or by entering 
into restrictive agreements with USMC. 
An outstanding example of a company which was set up to 
offer an extensive line of shoe machinery in competition with 
~SMC was the General Shoe Machinery Company which was in exist-
ence from 1917 to 1928. This company had developed a full line 
of welt machinery, sole laying machines, and had succeeded in 
~lacing its treeing and finishing machines in a number of shoe 
factories. As explained more fully in Chapter One, USMC was 
successful in eliminating this company from competition, and 
also acquired its main assets. 
Other companies which competed with USMC on a substantial 
basis were the Reece Shoe Machinery Company, C.C.Blake, Inc., 
and the Little Company. 
The Reece Company was engaged in competition with USMC from 
1911 to 1934, when USMC acquired all of its assets except those 
~sed in the manufacture of clicking machines. During that 
period the Reece Company was developing and marketing lasting, 
outsole stitching, and welt sewing machines. 
C. C. Blake Inc., was engaged in the development of such 
machinery as automatic welt sewing machines, and outsole stitch-
ing, lasting, rough rounding, and channeling machines. In 1932 
USMC acquired all the assets of this company and employed its 
( ~ ) 
principal inventor. 
By 1924 the Little Company had developed and patented a 
method of lasting and outsole stitching which became known as 
the Littleway process, with staple lasting and locksti~ch sole 
sewing·machines to be used in this process. In 1924 USMC con-
tracted with Little to incorporate the Littleway Process Co., 
which would carry on business in line with USMC's dictates. 
Then in 1927 USMC acquired all the stock of this company. Since 
that time the Littleway Process Company has operated as a 
wholly owned subsidiary of USMC, with USMC becoming the sole 
manufacturer and distributor of staple lasting and McKay lock-
. (3 ) 
stitch sole sewing machines used in the Littleway process. 
There were others which competed with USMC on a more limit-
ed scale. These were the Northern Machine. Company, General 
Machine Sales Company, Monfils Shoe Machinery Company, Brauner 
Manufacturing Company, Gimson Shoe Machinery Company, and a 
number of smaller companies. These we!l?e also.acquired and 
purchased by USMC. 
By its acquisitionsUSMC has eliminated competit6rs who had 
been engaged in a wide range of activities in the shoe machirery 
( ~ ) . 
( 3 ) • 
Complaint, op. cit., p. 13. 
Jbi&.~~ ..P...n. -~3-1~.;.~ ' ... 
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industry. It has also acquired valuable assets consisting of 
patent rights, equipment, shoe machines, and skilled services, 
although many of the patents so secured have been shelved. As 
in the case of the Littleway process, USMC has been able to 
commercialize with considerable success some of its acquired 
shoe processes and machines. Finally, by acquiring the patent 
rights and the line of machines from former competitors USMC has 
precluded their being developed or commercialized by remaining ( 1- ) 
competition, limiting these to very narrow fields. 
Restrictive Agreements 
USMC has also entered into a number of restrictive agree-
ments with other companies. By theseagreements USMC has become 
the distributor fqr machines manufactured by companies whose 
main line of business is not concerned with shoe machinery but 
who, for one reason or another, have put out one or a few minor 
not 
shoe machines. This waey/exactly the case with USMC's negotia-
tions with the Singer Sewing Machine Company. Here USMC met its 
match in the form of another powerful business organization. 
The circumstances involving these two large business concerns 
prove to be quite interesting. 
Prior to 1911 USMC did not produce any kind of upper stitch~ 
ing machines, while the only shoe machines that were made by the 
~ only shoe {Sc~ines that were made by the Singer Company were of · 
this kind. About this time USMC developed a buttonhole 
{ 1 ) . 
( 5 ) . Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., pp. 204-208. Ibid., p. 209. 
making machine, which was one kind of upper stitching machinery 
secured patents for it and, conducted an advertising campaign i 
shoe trade journals in order to place such machines in shoe 
factories. This action evidently aroused the ire of the Singer 
Company, for in 1912 it was instrumental in the formation of t 
Hamel Shoe ~.~achinery Company in Haverhill, Mass., to engage in 
the development, manufacture, and distribution of a broad line ( ~ ) . 
of shoe machinery. By 1919 at least six shoe manufacturers 
were using Hamel machinery exclusively and many others were ( 7 ) 
using some Hamel machines. 
USMC then realized that it had met its match and in 1919 
common understanding the two companies began to w~thdraw grad-
ually to the respective lines that existed in 1910, namely that 
USMC would refrain·from manufacturing upper fitti:ng machinery 
and Singer Company would not manufacture any other type of shoe 
machinery. 
The Hamel Shoe Machinery Company ceased doing business in 
1925, while USMC withdrew its offer of buttonhole making and 
( 8 ) 
buttonhole finishing machines early in 1936. Therefore, in 
analyzing the extent of the competition that USMC now faces, 
many Hamel machines that are still.outstanding in shoe factories 
are considered to be derived from a company now on a currently 
inactive status. 
( ~ ) . 
nited Shoe 
( '7 ) • 
( 8 ) • 
Defendent 1 s Brief, Vol. 2, pp. 932-33, Supreme Cour 
Machinery Corporation v. United States, 258 u~·s. 45 
Ibid., pp. 947-948. 
Trial Brief, Part I., op. cit., p. 217. 
Competition in the Major Shoe Machine.!:X Fields 
In 1947 USMC had control under lease or had sold a total of 
over 92 per cent of all the major shoe machines outstanding in 
footwear factories. This meant that USMC had manufactured or 
distributed 54,393 of the 58,886 major machines accounted for ( q ) 
at that time. Of the 18 major machine fields, USMC had put 
out over 90% of the machines in 14 fields, and over 80% of the 
machines in three other fields. So it is apparent that USMC 
encounters but limited competition in major shoe machinery with 
the exception of that offered by the Compo Shoe Machtnery CO., 
whose main product is cement sole attaching machines, but who 
also offers auxiliary cement shoe machines. 
In analyzing the competition that does exist in the major 
shoe machinery fields, there are some considerations that should 
be made. One of these is that a number of machines now in use 
in shoe factories do not represent the competition of a shoe 
machinery company that is now active. Another is that competi-
tion comes from quite different sources. Therefore the table 
showing such a breakdown is presented.on the next page;. 
From this table it can be seen that 935 machines· .s.represent 
inactive domestic competition, most of which areleft over from 
those companies which were unsuccessful in becoming established 
in the major shoe machinery fields. So of the 58,884 machines 
. outstanding as of 1947, only 3,556, or 6 per cent can be said to 
( 9 ) • Ibid., p. 125. 
5o 
represent any sort of active competition. Even these do not 
offer the proportionate amount of competition represented by 
their actual number wqen it is noted that non-USMC machines are 
often used as standby or lower capacity units. For example, 
USMC h&d only 40 per cent of the number of cement sole attachin@ 
machines outstanding, yet 53 per cent of total cement shoe pro-
( /0) 
duction was sole attached on USMC machines. 
TABLE 5 
NU1IDER OF 1~CHINES OUTSTANDING 
BY TYPE OF COMPETITION 
(as of May 1, 1947) 
Type of Competition 
United Shoe Machinery Corporation ••• 
Current Domestic Competition 
a. Shoe Machinery Manufacturers • • 
b. Shoe Repair Machinery Companies • 
Foreign Competition • • • • • • • • • • 
Inactive Domestic Competition ••••• 
Homemade Machines and Others • • • • • 
Total 



















Source: Trial Brief for the United States, u.s. v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corporation, Boston, Mass.,l949. Part I,p. 127 
From this table it is evident that the small amount of com ... 
petition that does exist to USMC 1 s major machines consists in trr 
!nJ.ain of current domestic competition. Accordingly, a further 
breakdown of this type of competition will reveal its character 
~nd extent. This table is presented on the following page. 
(lo). Ibid., p. 127. 
Sl 
TABLE 6 
CURRENT MAJOR SHOE MACHINERY COMPETITION 
(as of May 1, 1947) 
Company 
Machinery Number of Per Cent 
·Fields Machines of Total 
United Shoe Machinery Corp. 
• • Shoe Machinery Companies 
18 54,393 92.37 
1,018 '1. Compo Shoe Mchy. Corp. 4 
2. International Shoe Mchy.Corp. 2 326 
3. Puritan Mfg. Co .. 
• • • • • 2 249 4. Allied Shoe Mchy. Co. • • • 3 244 5. Atlas Tack Co. • • . . • • 1 236 6. Hermen Schwabe, Inc. • • • 2 122 7. Hamll n Machine Co. • • • • 7 112 8. Rapid Shoe Mchy. Co. 
• • • 1 102 9. Warwick Machine Co. • • . • 1 21 1o.·w.J.Young Shoe Mchy, Co. • 1 15 11 .. Vu1canide Shoe Mchy. Corp •• 1 6 12. Amco Shoe Mchy. Co. ... • • 1 6 13. Rotary Machine Co. 
• . • • 1 3 
Total. • • • • • • • • 2,460 Shoe Repair Mchy. Companies 4.18 
1. Landis Shoe Mchy. Co. • • • 3 332 2. Auto-Soler Co •• • • . • 1 35 3. Champion Shoe Mchy. Co. . • 3 27 
Total. • • • • • • • • 394 0.67 
Source: Trial Brief for the United States, u.s. v. United Shoe 
chinery· Corporation, Boston, Mass., 1949. Part I, p. 130. 
USMC's domestic competition in major shoe machines comes 
thirteen manufacturers of shoe factory machinery and three 
reducers of shoe repair machinery. Together they manufactured 
five per cent of the total number of major machines 
tstanding in 1947. The Compo Shoe Machinery Company is USMC.<t)s 
··:~..,. ·-
main comp~titor, yet it has less than two per cent of the total 
number of major machines. Of the 1,018 major machines that the 
Compo Company has outstanding, all but 22 are either cement sole 
(II ) 
attaching or pre-welt lastimg machines. The business activi-
ties of the Compo Company and USMC 1 s competitive tactics against 
Compo will be discussed after a brief description of some of the 
other companies manufacturing major shoe machinery. 
The International Shoe Machinery Corporation(Kamborian) is 
active only in the platform cover lasting machine field. Of the 
326 Kamborian machines, 304 were platform cover lasting machines 
while the remaining 22 were specialized outsole laying machines 
( 12..) 
also related to platform shoe production. Like the Compo 
Company Kamborian achieved a foothold by introducing technologi-
cal improvements which USMC had failed to anticipate. However, 
after USMC entered the fields it was eventually able to achieve 
a dominant position. 
The Puritan Manufac~uring Company is conf~ned to a limited 
field also. All but two of Puritan's 249 machines are used for 
( 13 ) 
stitchdown thread lasting. 
The Allied Shoe Machinery Company's business is concentrate 
in the latex cement segment of the cement sole attaching field. 
Of Allied's 244 machines outstanding kn 1947, 203 are cement 
sole attaching machines, while the remaining 24 are heel attach-
( /4) ' 
ing machines, mainly hand operated. 
The other nine companies, seven of which sell only one type 
~. ,,; ( ,,_ )~~ 
( /l- ) • 
( /.3 ) • 
\ ''T J • 
Ibid., p. 139. 




of machine do not offer any significant competition. 
Three manufacturers specializing in machinery for shoe 
epair shops rather than~ 'for shoe factories, have placed only 
.7 of 1% of the total of major machines outstanding in footwear 
factories. Neverless, USMC has insulated itself from even this 
otentially minor competition by forcing the principal shoe 
epair company, Landis, to refrain from actively soliciting shoe 
factory business by means of a restrictive agreement. 
Compo Shoe Machinery Company 
The Compo Shoe Machinery Company was organized in 1928 by 
(. 15 ) 
illiam Bresnahan and Barnard Solar. This company was 
cessful in commercializing. cement shoe machinery for the 
{l&.) 
acture of cement shoes. This represented one of the 
important developments in shoe machinery for some time. 
had not introduced such machinery for two r~asons. One was 
its officials did not think that the cement shoe would stay 
the market to any appreciable exten~, and the other was that 
SMC did notwish to displace other machines which it was 
lready marketing. Until 1931 virtually all cement shoes were 
ttomed by such machinery. Up_ to this time USMC did not fully 
reciate the threat to its Littleway process. When i.t became 
pparent that the shoe trade had accepted the cement shoe and 
accompanying machinery, USl!IC made some belated efforts to 
( 15). 
( lb ) • 
Li ttleway process and machines from being supplanted 
Terms. 
54-
Another step taken by USMC was an attempt to purchase Compo 
. ( 17) 
machinery and patents for $55,000. · This offer was rejected 
by William Bresnahan who was the president of the Compo Company. 
Therefore, USMC began its campaign in earnest to secure an 
increasing share of the market for cement shoe machinery. At 
first USMC hastily adopted a cement sole attaching machine which 
it had under development before 1928, but had not commercialized 
It also developed and distributed a number of cement shoe 
auxiliary machines at low prices to displace Compo machinery in 
shoe factories. Under. its leasing contracts, USMC was able to 
enforce certain clauses which would restrict the installation 
and use of Compo machines. Also, USMC offered special services 
to shoe factories in order to secure a larger share of the 
business. 
Here becomes evident a very good example of one aspect of 
USMC's production policy, that of withholding technological 
improvements in shoe machinery until it is forced to commercial-
ize them by the threat of.growing competitors. 
USMC 1 s price policy also came into play in its struggle 
with the Compo Company. In 1940 USIVICts Terms Committee, in 
referring to its Cement Sole Attaching Machine Model - A said, 
8 Terms were 'made giving more consideration to competition than 
cost, and in showing what they meant to us, all development 
. . (Ia) 
(cost) was left out of the picture. 11 
( }7 ) • 
( 18). 
Complaint, op. cit., p. 26, par. 68. 
Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., p. 285. 
ss 
In 1935, despite the fact that USMC was losing money on its 
Model B machine, the royalty on both the Model A and the Model 
( 19 ) • 
B was reduced to compete with the Compo Company. 
By these means USJIIC 's efforts to displace. the Compo Shoe 
Machinery Company g.ained much headway so that by 1946 USMC' s 
cement sole attaching machines were responsible for 53% of the 
. ( 20 ) 
work done on cement shoes and earned $577,000. 
In 1947 USMC's Program Committee presented a report showing 
the results of cement sole. attaching work done in the twelve 
months ending October 31, 1946, as follows: 
TABLE 7 
CEMENT SOLES ATTACHED BY USMC AND CO:MPETITORS 
(Year ending October 31, 1946) 
USMC Cement Sole At.taching-B • • • 
USMC Sole Laying-A • • • • • • • • 
Goodyear Improved Sole Lay~ng-F •• 
USMC Total • • • • • • • • • • •• • 
Compo Shoe Machinery Company • • • 
Others ~ • • • • • • • • • • • • • 









18 2 359 
199,778 







Source: USMC Program Committee Report, Government Exhibit 
Trial Brief,U.S,. .v. United S,hoe Machinery Corporation, 
Boston, Mass., May 2, 1949. Part I, p. 78. 
Even though USMC did not initiate the technological improve 
ments for cement sole attaching machinery, and despite its late 
start in the field, it has succeeded in gaining a large share of 
( /9 ) • Ibid. 
(~o). Ibid., p. 77. 
5b 
the market. Within recent years this trend has accelerated. The 
following graphs illustrate the rapid growth of cement shoe 
production since 1930, and USMC's increasing share of the market 
GRAPH 1 
cm~ENT SHOE.PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1930-1946) 
Million pairs 
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Cement Shoes - Per Cent of Total Production 
Source: Adapted from statistical data given in Appendix 1 
of the Trial Brief, u.s. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 
Boston, Mass., May 2, 1949. Part I. 
This graph shows the steady, rapid rise in the number of 
cement shoes, in actual figures from 4,600,000 pairs in 1930 to 
a total of 201,700,000 pairs in 1946. Although the total 
l 
S7 
number of all shoes produced during this period also rose to an 
extent, from 306,700,000 in 1930 to some 495 million in 1946, it 
can be seen from the line below the graph that the per cent of 
total production represented by cement shoes still increased 
considerably to a high of 40.7% in 1946 to become the number one 
method of sole attaching at that time. 
The next graph shows the percent of all cement soles 
attached by USMC, Compo, and others from 1930 to 1946. 
GRAPH 2 
CEMENT SOLES ATTACHED ON USMC, COMPO, AND OTHER 
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Source: Adapted from statistical data given in Appendix 1, 
Part B of the Trial Brief, u.s. v. United Shoe Mach~nery 
Competition in the Minor Shoe Machinery Fields 
There are a very large number of minor machines with a 
great variation in types and importance. Minor machines consist 
of types which are only slightly less important than major 
machines, some which are auxiliary in operation to other 
machines, and also those which are merely devices but under a 
broad definition are called machines. 
USMC has classified all minor machines into twelve 
machinery fields, and has set up twelve operating departments to 
handle each of these fields. Th~ name of each department 
appropriately designates the general process of shoe making for 
which the machines are utilized. One of these departments is 
the General Department and it is conce~ned with all machines not 
classified in the other twelve departments. 
Some of the departments are fairly simple in their makeup, 
ranging from the Eyeletting Department which handles but one 
type of machine which USMC alone manufactures, to more complex 
departments like the Goodyear Department which distributes 26 
types of machinery. In 1947, this department had 7,722 machines ( 2.1 ) 
outstanding, or 88% of the market. The Fitting Room Department 
is also quite complicated in nature. It has 18 types of 
machinery with 13,555 USMC machines outstanding in 1947, these 
( 2.-,2.) 
constituting 58% of the market. 
(~1). Ibid., p. 115. 
(~")-). Ibid. 
The following table shows the share of the market held by 
USMC and its competitors for each minor shoe machinery depart-
ment. 
TABLE 8 
MINOR SHOE :MACHINES OF USMC AND COMPETITORS 
(as of May 1, 1947) 
Competitors USMC 
USMC USMC Competitors Per Cent Per Cent 
Department Machines Machines of Total of Total 
1. Cement Shoe 3,415 2,130 37 63 
2. Cutting Die 673 87 11 89 
3. Eyeletting 839 
----- 100 
4. Fitting Room 13,555 9,730 42 58 
5. General 19,416 7,781 29 71 
6. Goodyear 7,722 1,077 12 88 
7. Heeling 3,502 695 17 83 
8. Lasting 3,192 438 12 88 
9. Littleway -853 50 6 94 
10. Metallic 3,380 986 23 77 
11. Pulling Over 4,138 138 ,3 97 
12. Rubber Shoe 709 769 52 48 
Totals 61,394 23,881 28 72 
Source: Adapted from statistical table of Trial Brief, u.s. 
v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, Boston, Mass., May 2, 
1949, Part I, p. 114. 
Although this statistical summary gives the number and 
percentage of minor machines in the various machinery fields, a 
more exact estimation of the competitive situation is obtained 
~hen some contributing factors are considered, for there are a 
number of reasons for believing that USMC's position in the 
~!nor machinery fields is much stronger than is reflected in the 
overall figure of 72% of the total number of machines outstand-
ing. 
1. A number of non-USMC machines represent competition in 
shoe factory supplies rather than in shoe machinery. 
2. Some of these machines are of an inconsequential natur 
when considered as machines although forming a large number 
statistically. They are distributed by companies which offer 
the device in order to promote their business of selling shoe 
i factory supplies. Pasting machines are offered by USMC compet-( 2...3) 
itors free when the customer buys cement. USMC only has 
45 percent of the total number of these which number some 2100 
('J.tf) 
on the market. Toe softening machines are often leased free 
of charge to buyers of box toe supplies. In this field USMC ha 
only 13 percent of the field and of the 54 different fields of 
minor machinery in the General Department, toe softening 
(.l..S .. ) 
machines account for almost half of all non-USMC machines. 
Therefor~ it can be seen that these do not really reflect 
competition in shoe machinery. 
3. Some of the machines included as minor shoe. machines 
have general uses in many industrial fields and are ~ot 
specifically shoe machines. 
4. Many recent increases in competitive machines are re-
installations of old machines as a result of war conditions and 
a general post-war shortage.of machinery. 
5. Many of the so-called competitive machines are 0 home 
madeu, i.e., made by the shoe manufacturer solely for his own 
( 2-3) • 
(l.'f). 
( l-S) • 
Tbid., p. 120. 
Complaint, op. cit., p. 46. 
Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., p. 121. 
use. Machines manufactured by a few big shoe companies solely 
for their own use account for a large share of non-USMC machine~, 
as shown in the following table. 
TABLE $ 
MINOR SHOE MACHINERY - HOMEMADE ~1U\,CHINES 
(as of May 1, 1947) 
Homemade Total Non-USMC 
Machines Machines 
Edge Trimming 272 354 
Counter Pasting 198 207 
Finishing Shafts 154 . 212 







Source: Trial Brief, u.s. v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corporatibn; Boston, Mass., May 2, 1949, Part I, p. 122. 
When all these factors are considered in tneir entirety it 
is evident that USMC also has a dominant position·in the minor 
machinery fields •. However, there are areas whe~e even though 
competition is limited it exerts enough pressure to force USMC 
to revise the prices and ·terms on its machines, and developt -
new models in order to me~t this competition effectivelt~ In 
fact, USMC is so intent upon controlling all machinery fields 
that it has reduced its profit and even taken a loss on some 
minor machines in order to retain its control of the market. 
CHAPTER .IV 
., 
THE PRICE POLICY OF THE 
UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION 
THE PRICE POLICY OF THE 
UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION 
USMCts price policy is largely determined and conditioned 
by the consideration of several important factors. First of all 
its leasing and rental system provides the basis for most of the 
prices, terms, and annual revenue derived from USMC shoe machin-
ery. This system of leasing· and renting machines in turn was 
initiated because of the structure of the shoe industry and the 
prevailing attitudes of shoe manufacturers •. Next USMC 1 has 
been influenced considerably by the character and extent of com-
petition it faces. It might be said that USMC's main objective 
in dealing with competitors is to restrict or eliminate them· 
rnhenever possible by a variety of means at its disposal. USMC'a 
price policy has implemented this objective in a number of 
instances. Finally, USMC 1 s price policy has been· closely relatec 
to another of its main objectives, that of securing control of 
the market for a full line of shoe machinery, which leads ulti-
nately to the perpetuatfuon and strengthening of ita dominant 
position in the shoe machinery industry. USMC is able to obtain 
a highly profitable annual revenue from its leased major machine~, 
;: .. : 
~nd relie·s on this return to offset the losses and low rate of 
profit on many of its competitive minor machines in order to keer 
. ( I ) '1: 
the market for the latter. This policy also helps USMC in 
keeping shoe manufacturers dependent upon USMC machines • 
. < I ) • __ Trial Brief, U.s. v. USMq,_ Boa to~, .!·1ay, 1949, 
Part J:, .p.. ?$3e;, ___ ~. :_ , . __ _, . -.- , . _ __ ·---
Analysis of USMC' s Annual Income 
The extensive control of the market for shoe machinery held 
by USMC over the years can be seen readily by examining the. 
figures for its annual revenue and net income over any period of 
time and noting the remarkable stability of the returns received 
by USMC for its output of shoe machinery. This stability is all 
the more amazing when one thinks of the violent ups and downs of 
business conditions in general for the country as a whole. 
Whether they be boom years, depression years, war time, or the 
~ost-war period, for USMC business is always good. 
Over the period 1924 to 1933 USMC made $64,400,000 and paid 
( '2.. ) 
cash dividends of ·$63,900,000. During this period USMC 1 s 
!annual income did not fluctuate more than $3,700,000 registering,: 
~ high of $9,670,000 in 1930 and a low of $6,023,000. in\1933. In 
lthe deep depression years of 1931 and 1932 USMC showed a good 
( .3 ) 
~eturn earning $8,400,000in 1931 and $7,500,000in 1932. 
USMC's percentage of net income to gross operating income 
also shows the earning power of this corporation. In 1935 this 
percentage was 19.07, in 1937 it was 17.04%, and in 1940 it ( t ) 
showed the nice ratio of 20.63%. 
On the following page there is given a graph showing USMCls 
annual revenue secured from the royalties, rentals, and license 
fees of its shoe machinery, and its net income from 1935 to 1950 
New 
Vol. 
( '2- ) • Moody, Manual of 
York~ 1924 - 1932. ( 3 J. Ibid. ( 4 ) • Standard & Poor, 
12, No. 9, pp. 993-8. 
Investments, Industrial Securities, 
Corporation Records, New York, 1951. 
I 
GRAPH 3 
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Source: Adapted from data given in Standard & Poor's 
Corporation Records, New York, 1951. Vol.l2,No.9, pp. 993-8 
And Moody's Manual of Investments, Industrial Securities, 
New York, 1941, pp. 2527-31. 
The Leasing and Rental System 
The lea.sing and rental system embodies the heart of USMC r s 
price policy and forms the most important characteristics of it. 
USMC's annual revenue from shoe machinery is derived mainly from 
this source. In 1946 USMC received a gross income of $21,504,54 
from the lease of its machines, a gross income of $3,513,074 frot 
the sale of parts, and a gross income of only $507,036 from the ( s) . 
sale of machines. 
The inception of the leasing system fo·r shoe machinery and 
the circumstances leading to its adoption and widespread use are 
quite interesting. Prior to the Civil War most of the shoe 
~aking processes were performed by hand. Any shoe machinery 
that was in existence was simple and relatively inexpensive, so 
that most shoe manufacture~s could afford them. Those that were 
~nable to purchase shoe machinery could do without them and stil 
do business. 
When Lyman Blake came up with his innovation of stitching 
shoes mechanically, most shoe manufacturers were not impressed 
~y it. and went right on fastening soles by hand. Then Blake sole 
P,is invention to Colonel Gordon McKay, who, although being neithe~r> 
~hoe manufacturer nor inventor, was a first class promoter and 
prganizer. At first McKay was unable to sell the machine on any 
~ucc~ssful scale, since it was large, complicated, delicate and 
~xpensive. For many small shoe manufacturers the purchase ,of 
J?) ~ . Compl~i~t, u.s •. y. USIVIG~ .ljoston, vecem'Oer, l~4'/, p. 6 
. -· .. _. .~ ·l, 0 . .:.....:_.._- .·" .... -.. : __ :; 
such a machine was out of the question. After thinking the 
matter over and realizing that the cost of investing in the 
machine was deterring shoe makers from buying it, Mckay hit upon 
the idea of leasing his machine. He estimated what the machine 
would save the manufacturer for each pair of shoes produced, set 
a fraction of this saving as a royalty, added to this a moderate 
sum for installation costs, and then he talked the shoe maker 
( {, ) 
into trying the machine on such a basis. 
It was soon found that the use of the Mckay machine meant 
such a great savings in labor costs, that any manufacturer not 
using it was put at such a competitive disadvantage that he ( 7 ) . 
could not long remain in business. 
The leasing system proved to be quite profitable to McKay 
and was soon copied by other manufacturers of complicated and 
expensive shoe machinery that came into use in the latter part 
of. the century. When the Goodyear Shoe Machinery Company intro-
duced its welt-process machine, next only to the McKay machine 
in importance to shoe manufacturing, it found the leasing system 
so thoroughly intrenched that there was no choice but to adopt 
( 8 ) 
it. 
Therefore when the United Shoe Machinery Company was formed 
it merely took over this. already established method of supplying 
,tf3hoe machinery to the shoe trade and has maintained it string-
ently ever since. Besiaes, the leasing system also involves two 
.(~ ). Keir, Malcolm, Manufacturing, New York, 1928, p. 459. 
( 1. ) • Ibid., ;_-;. . .:)0. 
( 3 ) • Ibid. , p • 460 .. 
other important a:sp~cts,of_ USMC's price and production policy. 
Under USMC 1 s. leasing contracts the servicing of its machines 
in shoe factories has provided the means whereby USMC's roadm.en 
gain entry to practically every shoe plant in the United States. 
In this way USMC is able to collect detailed, and reliable infon -( q ) 
ation on all competitive machines in these plants. The 
second factor is the profitable business of supplying spare partl 
for outworn, broken, 'or lost pieces of machinery. This business 
provides a generous return each year to USMC on its capital 
investment. As a matter of fact it i:s unlikely that USMC can 
support itself on a strict production ana sales basis. 
Consequently, its main manufacturing plant in Beverly, Mass., is 
like an enormous stock room, being concerned more with manufact-
~ring shoe machinery parts than shoe machines as such. 
At first USMC utilized the tying-in clause in its leasing 
contracts by which shoe manufacturers were required to take a 
~roup of machines including at least one basic shoe machine, if 
~hey wished to obtain one of USMC 1 s accessory machines. But in 
P-922 a Supreme Court decr·ee under the Clayton Act forbade USMC 
fthe use of such a clause. Since then lease terms are applied to 
but one unit or machine at a time. This. is the main reason why 
pne finds so many odd fractions as l/5th of a cent, 1/Sth of a 
~ent, etc., as the royalty paid by shoe manufacturers on process· 
~s involving a number of diverse shoe machines. 
Practically all of USMC's major machines and a number of 
(9) • Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., pp. 405-6. 
its minor machines are supplied to shoe manufacturers on lease 
only, some machines are offered on lease or sale terms at.the 
option of the buyer, and the rest are made available on sale 
( /0) . 
terms. However, another aspect of USMC's price policy 
presents itself at this point when it is noted that USMC makes 
it a practice to quote sale price~ on its shoe machines so 
offered which are much higher than the capitalization of the 
royalties on these machines. In this way shoe manufacturers are 
encouraged to lease or rent machines instead of buying nhem. 
indication of the predominance of machines out on lease can 
be seen from the figures in 1946 which show that over 80 per cen 
of USMC 1 s machines then in shoe factories were distributed on 
ease giving it a gross income of $21,504,541, while its gross 
( II ) 
income from the sale of machines was on~y $507,036. 
( /O). USMC offers on a lease basis only all of its major 
chines except cutting press machines, three models of leveling;, 
chines, and one McKay sewing machine; all of its minor machine 
~~!~•uu•~ed by six departments, i.e., Lasting, Heeling, Pulling Over 
allic, Goodyear, and Cement Shoe Departments; and the most 
ortant minor machines handled by other departments. A limited 
ber of unimportant machines handled by its General Department 
e offered for sale only. All other machines are offered on 
tional sale or lease terms. ( From the Defendantrs Answer to 
C laint U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, Distri 
.S.·, Boston, Mass., May 27, 1948, Exs. B, c, Dl, 
b9 
Lease Terms and Conditions 
The leasing contracts for most of USMC's shoe machines 
stipulate that the shoe manufacturer using the machines must pay 
~ flat rental charge or a unit charge, the latter being based 
~pon the number of shoes or units upon which the machine is used, 
pr upon the number of operations performed by the machines. 
Lease terms for other machines provide for the payment of both 
lr>ental and unit charges. Where unit charge machines are adaptab"'e 
for more than one kind of operation, separate charges are assessed 
( /2.-) 
~or each operation. 
The following table shows a breakdown of the conditions 
~pon which USMC machines are offered to shoe manufacturers. The 
~igures for machines relate to the types or models of machines 
~nd not the quantity of machines produced. 
TABLE 10 
LEASE AND SALE TERMS ON USMC MACHINES 




Lease only • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• 178 
Flat rental or unit charges ••••• 91 
Both flat rental and unit charges •• 85 
Others • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • 2 
Lease or.Sale • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 122 
Sale only • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 42 
Total 342 
Source: Adapted from data on page 245, Trial Brief for U.S. 
u.s. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,Bostom,Mass.,May 2,1949 
(/'}....). Complaint, op. cit., p. 23.; 
;o 
USMC 1 s lease contracts reserve to it the sole and exclusive 
property of its machines and al.low the shoe manufacturers to use 
~he machines only for specified purposes. The standard lease 
( 1.2>) ; ; 
pontains four main provisions. 
1. The lessee must contract for the use of the machine for 
~t least ten years during which time the lease may be cancelled 
Jnly by USMC. After this period the lessee may continue. to use 
Ghe machine either by renewal of the lease or under the condition 
Ghat he or USMC can terminate the lease upon sixty days notice. 
2. For each unit charge machine the lessee must agree either 
~o use the machine upon a specified minimum number of pair of 
~hoes each month or else pay USMC a specified sum of money at the 
~nd of each month during which the machine is not used at this 
!uinimum rate. 
3. The lessee of any unit charge machine shall ~se the 
~achine to its full capacity upon all shoes made by him upon 
Which the machine is capable of being used. 
4. When the lease expires the lessee shall surrender the 
!uachine to USMC in good order and condition or reimburse USMC 
for the cost of all broken or missing parts. The lessee is also 
required to pay a ureturn charge8 , i.e., a stipulat~d sum of 
~oney varying from 20 per cent to 85 per cent of the value of 
the machine. 
When looked at in their entirety these conditions are seen 
to be quite burdensome and snringent to the shoe manufacturer. 
( 13). Trial Brief. Part I. on. cit. n't:l 24R-7 
11 
But since most shoe manufa~tu~ers are dependent·upon USMC 
machines to stay in business and since the shoe manufacturing 
trade is highly competitive with a large number of small 
companies in the field, there is very little in the way of 
effective protest that can be done about these terms. Looking 
back to the first· chapter of this thesis we see that from time 
to time the larger shoe manufacturing companies have attempted 
to put up a fight against USMC's policies, but in the end they 
had to cease their activities in the shoe machinery field or sel 
out their interests to USMC. This was the case of the General 
Shoe Iliachinery Company which was backed by International Shoe 
. Company and several other large shoe companies. There are still 
lingering evidences of underlying resistance to be found in the 
larger shoe companies when one notices that they use a number of 
so-called home made machines in their manufacturing processes. 
These are innovated and built expressly for the use of the 
~articular manufacturer originating them and cannot be cormner-
cialized and sold to other companies. Obviously they are used 
!because of their advantages over USMC machines. 
Important aspects of these lease terms are that USMC has so 
~ashioned the conditions of the leases that in effect they tend 
to perpetuate the use of USMC machines by shoe manufacturers 
~nd also diminish the possibility of a shoe mairu.facturer taking. 
!competitive machines either suring the period of the lease or 
~pon its expiration. 
The surrender clauseti+Jimposes burdensome, financial 
conditions upon shoe manufacturers. The surrender requirements 
place a prohibitive price upon any change that a lessee would 
~ish to make to a competitive machine.· The lessee must return 
lthe machine to USMC in good CO?di tion, reimbursing usm:c for the 
cost of broken or missing parts and pay a ·cash sum varying from 
~o% to 85% df the value of the machine. Besides this, USMC 
~sually attempts to have the shoe manufacturer renew the lease. 
or else run the risk of not being able to secure other USMC 
. 
~achines that he may need in the future. The usual result is 
that USMC is successful in securing a five-year renewal of its 
~ease. Since the same surrender terms apply at the end of this 
~eriod the effect is that the shoe manufacturer becomes a 
( 15) 
perpetual customer of UStlC. Thus USMC' s poli~y has had the 
effect of forestalling the introduction of competing shoe 
~achinery and preventing shoe manufacturers from having a 
relatively free choice as to which shoe machine~y company they 
shall do business. 
The Relation Between the Leasing System 
and the ~ Industry 
The main factors leading to the introduction of the leasing 
system for shoe machinery were as follows: 
1. Manw shoe companies were so small that they could not 
well be adapted to machine production. 
(14). Ibid., p. 248. 
( IS ) • Ibid. 
2. Most shoe· manufacturers has but a limited amount ot.' 
capital to invest· so tha~ they could not afford the outright 
purchase of such machinery as the McKay machine or the Goodyear 
welt sewer. 
7t./ 
3. Ivlany shoe manufacturers did not look favorably upon 
such machines or did not consider them essential. 
However, upon the inception of the leasing system by Colone~ 
McKay, the use of his machine and others were quickly adopted 
and soon became a competitive necessity. This essentially led 
to the situation.wherein shoe manufacturers were dependent upon 
the product of shoe machinery compa~ies rather than the reverse. 
USMC took full advantage of this situation and has endeavored to 
maintat'n and extend it with great success since it has had a 
virtual monopoly on all major shoe machinery except upper 
stitching machines and a very strong position in most minor 
machinery fields. 
One might wonder why it is that shoe manufacturers have not 
resisted the trend in which they have become dependent upon 
USMC's products and bound to it by the terms and conditions of 
its leasiP~ system. 
Here a number of factors which enter the picture, and 
explain the lack of organized resistance to USMC's terms and 
prices. They have to do with the structure of the shoe industr~ 
The tradition of independence created by the centuries in 
which shoemaking has been an individual and esteemed craft, is a 
factor which makes itself felt to this day. It served to 
same prices and terms for all shoe manufactuvers, large or ~m~{l \ 71 
USMC has never deviated from its policy of standard uniform 
rates. The royalty per unit of output is the same for all shoe 
makers. Despite pressure from the largest shoe manufacturers to 
introduce a sliding scale of royal ties in accordance with the 
greater or less use o.f any machine, USMC has r~mained steadfast. 
Consequently, the relative machine cost per pair of shoes has 
been the same for a shoe manufacturer with a production of 300 (.2.a) 
pairs daily as for one with an output of 3000 pairs a day. 
Second, the lease system encourages small scale shoe 
manufactuners and increases the intensity of competition by 
making it very easy to enter the trade. All that is required is 
a small amount of capital and some skill and experience, since 
the purchase of expensive machinery is not essential and loft 
space is usually readily available for rent. 
USMC sets the prices, sharges and terms on its optional 
sale or lease machines so as to induce shoe manufacturers to 
( 2-/ ) 
lease ratherthan purchase them. This policy results in a 
lower return to USMC from the lease of such machines than they 
would receive from the sale of them. The terms are computed so 
that the return in ten years will be the ten year expense of the (2.:v) 
machine plus 125% profit. This is the profit received from 
the sale of the machine. If the machine is leased, then USMC 
receives but 100% profit on the machine. This is but anoth~ 
( 19 ) • 
( .2.0) • 
(2-t). 
(). '2--') • 
Keir, op. cit., pp. 460-461. 
Ibid. 
Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit~, p. 255. 
Ibid •• p. 248 •. 
method by which USMC attempts to keep shoe manufacturers 
.dependent upon its product over a period of time. 
Revision of Lease and Sale Terms 
to Meet Competition 
In order to restrict and eliminate competition USMC often 
has revised its lease and sale terms on certain machines. At 
othEr times USMC developed new machines and improvements to meet 
the threat of competition. These new machines and improvements 
were made available to shoe manufacturers at lower rates than 
would otherwise be the case. Here, USMC would make use of the 
high revenue it received from its machines where it faced little 
or no comp'eti tion. 
Of the many machines it produces USMC gets 62 percent of 
its revenue from a set of machines which perform only ten of the 
(2..3) 
large number of operations in the shoe making l'rocess. These 
( ~'1-) 
are priced so as to·return maximum profits, and provide the 
means by which USMC can maintain a complete line of auxiliary 
machines, some of which barely pay their own way, or even ( 25) . 
incur:. losses. In this way, not only does USMC take advant-
age of the fact that it is completely integrated in carrying a 
full line of shoe machinery, but it also adopts a price policy 
which implements the objective of maintaining such a full line 
(;!..3). ·Trial Brief for the United States. U.S. v. United 
Shoe MachineJey Corporation, Boston, Mass., May 2, 1949. Partiii, 
Vol. VI, pp. 326, 330, 344. 
(~~). Ibid., pp. 326, 330. 
(;2..5"'"). Ibid., pp. 326, 344. 
77-
of ma'chinery. 
Of the many instances in which such tactics were used a few 
(~~) . 
will be cited. USMC eliminated competition from companies in 
the fields of Heel Seat Fitting Machinery and Wood Heel Attachin 
Machinery. These companies included the Compo Shoe Machinery 
Company and the Brauer and Wagner Shoe Machinery Company in both 
fields. Oth~r instances were the elimination of the Peerless 
Mfg. Company in the field o~ Perforating Machinery and the 
Hamlin Shoe Machinery Company in the field of Trimming M~chinery 
The manner in which these practices were utilized is well ill-
ustrated in the discussion of competition between USMC and the 
Compo Shoe Machinery Company in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
Another good example can be given in USMCts action against 
the Sheehan and Egan Company in the field of Quarter Lining 
Moulding Machinery. In April, 1937 USMC adopted its Quarter 
Lining Moulding Machine-Model A, and offered it on the market in 
order to compete with a similar machine equipped by Sheehan & 
(l-7) 
Egan of Lynn, Mass. In setting its terms USMC deviated 
extremely from its regular pricing policy. Instead of the nor-
~al 100% sale profit and 125% lease profit, the terms gave only ( ).9) 
~9.76% sale profit or 64.7~ lease profit. Although the 
Sheehan & Egan Company was eliminated as a competitor in 1938 
through the employment of Egan by USMC, USMC's venture in Quarter 
(~'). Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., pp. 281-2. 
( .2.1). Trial Briet', Part III; U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery 
porporation, Boston, Mass., May 2, 1949. Vol. VII, p. 108. (2&). Ibid., p. 107. 
Moulding Machinery turned out to be an unprofitable one. Of 14 





By 1940 the terms on this machine had to 
be wi thdravm. 
As long as there appeared some competition in any part of 
the shoe machinery industry, USMC felt uneasy about it. · Its 
policy was succinctly stated by one of its officials in this 
respect. 
0 The corporation cannot allow anyone to bring out 
a superior line of machines for any purpose whatever. 
We cannot let anyone get a substantial hold on our 
trade. 111 ( JJ ) 
USMC also attempted t·o fight competition by modifying its 
lease and sale terms on existing machinery. It did this by 
reducing rental, unit and sale charges, substituting rental for 
lease charges, inducing manufacturers of shoes to lease rather 
than buy shoe machinery, and by distributing 0 fightingu machines 
(.3 2-) 
to replace and prevent the installation of competitive machinery 
The full capacity clause under which a shoe manufacturer 
contracts to use USl'.W 1 s machines for all the work upon which it 
is capable of being used is another competitive weapon employed 
by USMC. Under such an agreement a shoe maker cannot use a 
competitive machine for any similar work during the leasing 
{.33) 
period of an USMC machine. Indeed, under such terms a shoe 
~anufacturer could not use machines of other shoe machinery 
Ibid., p. 110 .. 
Ibid., pp. 111-112. 
(')...tt). 
(Jo). 
( ~' ) . ( ~'2,.). 
( 33). 
Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., p. 361. 
Ibid., p. 282. 
Ibid., p. 257. 
companies at all as long as the machines he leased from USM~ 
were capable of performing all of his requirements. 
When USMC sets terms on its lease machines it takes into 
account the fact that most lessees will not use them beyond 40 
to 50 percent of their capacity and so prices them sufficiently 
high to insure the desired financial return when the machines 
. (31./) 
are used to such an extent. 
As a rule, USMC does not invoke the terms clause or the 
full capacity clause unless a competitive installation appears 
in a shoe factory. These are soon detected by USMC r s roadmen 
who make a report of such competitive machines. 
In summary,USMC's price policy is concerned with three main 
objectives. 
1. To keep shoe manufacturers reliant upon USMC's machines 
to as great an extent as possible, to which end USMC attempts to 
develop and control the market for a full line of machinery. 
2. To fight, eliminate and forestall competition by an 
array of supplemental and coordinated methods·and practices. 
3. After insuring· a satisfactory status in r.egard to the 
first two objectives, USMC then is able to secure a stable rate 
of profit, mainly from its major shoe machines and from the more 
important minor machinery f-ields. 
(~'f). Ibid., p. 279. 
' £ 
CHAPTER V 
PRODUCTION POLICY OF THE 
UNITED SHOE ~~CHINERY CORPORATION 
PRODUCTION POLICY _,'QE THE 
UNITED SHOE IMCHINERY CORPORATION 
USMC's production policy has been geared to two main 
!objectives,· first, that of manufacturing a full line of machinery 
~or the shoe trade with a supplementary program of producing a 
~ultitude of spare parts and attachments to existing machinery, 
~nd second, the maintenance of an extensive and well staffed 
~esearch Division which is charged with the responsibility of 
~ontinually developing new types of machinery and improvements ir. 
prder t.o match competitive machines, and also to store up a 
~eserve of shelved improvements in the event of the appearance of 
pther competitive installations. The work of the Research 
Division is closely coordinated and tied up with the activities 
pf · US~/IC 's Patent Department and USMC' s roadmen. USMC' s program . 
pf acquisitions has also supplemented the efforts of its 
~esearch Division by adding to~t the assets, machinery, patent 
~ights, and inventive skills of fo~er competitors. These 
~cquisitions have been discussed in Chapter One. 
Development of ~ Full Line of Machinery 
When USMC w_as formed in 1899 by the merger pf the three 
utstanding shoe machinery companies in the field at that time, 
Ghe effect was to give USMC control over the manufacture of 
practically all the welt sewing, outside stitching, lasting, 
~etallic fastenin& and heel attaching machines then being manu-
Pactured and distributed in the U.S. This amounted to something 
8/ 
like 95% of the market of shoe machinery at that time. 
Since then,not only has USMC continued to manufacture and 
the aforementioned shoe machines, but it has also 
nded its business to manufacturing and distributing a great 
of other types of machines,as well as expanding its 
'""~'rKut to keep~up with the increase in the use of shoe machines 
the increase in the quantity of shoe production up to the 
By referring to Graph 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis, it 
can be seen that the total number of pairs of shoes produced in 
930 was some 306 millions. Since then total shoe production 
s risen to almost 500 millions of pairs of shoes, produced in 
USMC machines have accounted for the major share of 
recessing of these shoes. 
Part of USMC 1 s control of the market for various types of 
machinery has been secured by the acquisition of the patent 
ights, machines, and keymen of its competitons. These have 
lemented the developmental program of USMC's large and well 
division. USMC doesn't lose a moment putting ou 
itional types of machinery or improvements whenever it learns 
t a competitor has made an installation in some shoe factory 
matter how obscure the location of the plant or how minor the 
etitive machine. By the reports of its ever watchful road-
Research Division may be stimulated to feverish 
ctivity upon being informed of a new development in competitive 
machinery. 
.JJ • .S. v.~ •. US~n:.c · )3oston December, 1947,p.5. 
Instead of restricting output USMC attempts to expand it 
even goes to the point of incurring losses and taking a 
reatly reduced profit upon some machines in order to strengthen 
its control of the market, limiting existing competition,and 
orestalling possible future competition. This would seem to 
qualify somewhat the application of standard economic theory 
the monopolistic firm restricting output or not going 
point where it maximizes profits. In other words?the 
threat of competition plays a determining part in the 
production policy of an organization like the USMC, 
-
though it enjoys a virtual monopoly of the industry. 
So at present USMC manufactures and distributes all types 
major machines except upper stitching. USMC's strong positi 
n the major machinery field is shown in Table~ Pagei~of this 
It also engages in the manufacture of practically all 
minor shoe machinery, -.,. ~·· having the major share of t 
in many of these. Reference to Table , Page of this 
gives a picture of USMC 1 s position in regard to these 
Most of USMC 1 s shoe machinery is out on lease. Under the 
conditions of its lease contracts shoe manufacturers 
e responsible for keeping USMC machines in good repair. Not 
but a~so they are required to purchase from USMC. all 
parts, extras, improvements, and devices of any kind 
' (1,...) 
used in the operation of USMC machines. USMC has 
' 
also designed its machines. in such a way that parts to them are 
of off-standard specifications which can be obtained only from 
trrSMC. Therefore,with the enforcement of such stipulations, USMC 
is able to do a good business in the manufacture and sale of 
( 3 ) 
shoe machinery parts. In 1946 USMC had a gross income of 
over three and one-half million dollars from the sale of parts, 
~hile receiving only half a million dollars from the sale of its 
. . (4 ) 
shoe machines. About the same situation has existed in other 
tyears. 
USMC 1 s Patent Structure 
In order to protect its business of manufacturing a full 
~ine of shoe machinery, USMC has built up a vast and complex 
patent structure engrossing the rights to produce a wide variety 
pf machines and improvements relating to shoe machinery. By this 
~eans, USMC has excluded competitors from engaging in the manu-
~acture and marketing of most of its types of machines, especialJW 
~n the major machine fields. 
0 Since 1920 USMC and its subsidiaries have acquir-
ed 6,712 United States patents, the vast majority of 
which relate to shoe machinery. 4,172 of these patents, 
including 3,777 standing in USMC's name have been 
issued since January 1, 1930 •••••••..•• Since 1930, 
USMC also has acquired 325 patents and 200 inventions 
from persons and companies unaffiliated with USMC. 11 ( S ) 
lrhese have been the outcome of its acquisition·: program and 
related activities. 
( .3 ) • 
( 4 ) • ( s ) . 
Complaint, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
Page G& This Thesis. 
Complaint, op. cit., p. 29. 
A number of pat·ents are used by USMC to claim patent 
protection upon machinery which has been on the market for many 
years and on which all basic patents have expired. USMC's 
competitors refrain from marketing similar machinery for fear of 
( h ) 
infringd:ng~ USM:G' s patents. 
USMC also seeks to forestall competition by anticipating 
certain improvBm~nts to existing shoe machinery. The activities 
of USMC's Patent Department are directly related to the program 
of its Research DivisiGn, which in turn is stimulated into actiol 
~y the reports of USMC 1 s roadmen. This occurs in the following 
tmanner. 
USMC•s roadm..:en secure entry to shoe factories by virtue of 
the lease contracts which give USMC the right to .s.ervice and 
repair its leased machines. When a roadman enters a shoe. plant 
for such a purpose, he is also on the alert for any competitive 
installations. If there are any then the roadman prepares 
detailed information about it upon an OMIR (Outside Machine 
~nstallation Report) which is sent first to a master file in 
USMC's Boston Office and then circulated to any of USMC•s opera-
ting departments that are interested, and also to US:MC•s higher 
management. The operating departments in turn notify the 
Research Division of the appearance of the competitive installa-
tion and what should be done about it. The Research Division 
calls the attention of the Patent Department to this occurrence 
~hich in turn deploys roadmen to seek infringement evidence. 
Such evidence is often secured. If it is not, then USMC' s manage-
( b ) • Ibid. 
ment may go ahead and threaten an infringement suit to the 
competitor involved on the basis of its tremendously ramified 
patent system. Often the competitor Gannet stand the cost of th~ 
suit and withdraws from the fi~ld. However, if he is persisten~ 
then USMC 1 s Research Division goes ahead and develops a new type 
of machine to compete with the installation. 
In this way USMC 1 s research activity is stimulated or 
retarded according to the existence of competitive activity 
reported by its roadmen. The failure of USMC to commercialize 
some improved machines can often be attributed to the assurance 
USMC receives from its roadmen that little or no competitive ( 7 ) 
activity existed. 
USMC's Research Division 
.The development of a full line of machinery by USMC and its 
control over the major part of the shoe machinery business stems 
largely from the activities of its Research Division. Not only 
this, but another important aspect of the functioning of the 
Research Division is its research and aevelopment which even-
tually lead to securing patents on many types of machines and 
improvements which are often withheld from the market until such 
a time as the need arises for its introduction because of 
competitive necessity. Otherwise, such innovations are 
. ( 8 ) 
11shelved. 11 
USiviC 1 s Research Division f'or many years has consisted of a 
( 7 ) • 
( g ) • 
Ibid., p. 409. 
See Appendix - A, Glossary of ferms. 
large number of inventors, engineers, chemists, mechanics and 
supporting personnel to carry out its program. In 1946 these 
came to approximately 500 persons with a current annual budget ( q ) 
of three million dollars. 
USMC's Patent Department has a staff of 25 full-time 
lawyers who work in close collaboration with the Research 
Division. 
Through USMC' s acquisition program its Research Division 
has often secured the services of some of the best inventors of 
·shoe machinery. These have proven to be of much value in adding 
to USMC's control of the rights to manufacture a rather exten-
sive line of . shoe machines. Pym has been USMC' s leading inven-
tor in the toe-lasting field, while Ballard, Naugler and Monfils 
( /0) 
have made important contributions to USMC's patent blanket. 
Although USMC has been continually securing a large number 
of patents for new machines and improvements it has not followed 
the policy of developing these rapidly and commercializing them. 
Of the 3,777 patents acquired by USMC since 1930, 2729 are 
11paper3 patents which USMC has not commercialized to any notice-( II ) 
able degree. Many of these paper patents allude to machinery 
which, if commercialized, would displace USMC machines now on 
the market or in shoe factories. 
This same policy was followed by USMC in its acquisition 
program. 
( q ) • 
( /0 ) • ( ,, ) . 
After secu~ing many types of shoe machines which had 
Defendant's Answer, op. cit., p. 49. 
Trial Brief, Part T, op. cit., p. 208. 
Comnlaint on. cit- n 30 
~7 
already been commercialized or sufficiently developed to be 
marketed, USMC proceeded to withdraw them from the market. It 
junked the Blake automatic line of welt machinery and shelved 
(! l-) 
the Kamborian side laster. Then in a number of instances it 
withdrew shoe machines from shoe factories after purchasing the 
rights from competitors. The Barge cement sole presses, Advance 
Leather splitting machine and Keighley inseam trimming machine 
( 13 ) 
are cases where this occurred. 
In other cases where USMC purchased the business of its 
competitors, the manufacture of the product of these competitors 
then was discontinued. This happened with General Shoe Machine 
Company sole laying, welting and treeing machines, Reece turn 
sewing, welting and i:P.I3eam trimming machines, and the Monfils 
(!+) 
wood heel nailer. 
In 1947, of the 554 machine models that USMC had out on 
lease or sola, .462 were in use before 1930, while 92 were 
adopted since 1930. It is interesting to note that these 92 
models were covered by only 363 of the 3,777 patents secured by 
USMC since 1930. So less than ten percent of USMC's patents fo ( 1.5) 
this period have been commercialized by means of new models. 
The relation between usr.IC 's control of the market for shoe 
machinery and its production policy of manufacturing old type 
models can be seen by looking at the adoption dates of its most 
important machines and the extent to which the old models are 
( I~) • 
( 13 ) • 
( Ji ) • 
( IS). 
Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., p. 206. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 207. 
Ibid. I :rr.- ~15. 
still utilized in shoe factories. Here the threat of competi-
tion has not arisen to compel usvrc to market improved machinery. 
A good example which will bring out the main points to be 
emphasized can be found in USMC 1 s production of its clicking 
machine. 
The wide use of this machine can be judged by noting that 
a statement made by USMC 1 s Research Division in 1946 rep!Drted 
that uapproximately 85% of u~per leather cutting is done by 
(/b) 
machine,and 15% by hand.• In 1946 497,099,000 pairs of shoes 
were produced, of these, 410,000,000 pairs were processed by 
( 17) 
clicking machines. The importance of this machine to usr.JIC is 
shown by the fact that for the fiscal year ending February 28, 
1947, USMC 1 s clicking machines earned ·$1,258,000 or about 5.7% 
( 18) 
of USMC 1 s total machine revenue. 
The principal clicking machine currently offered by USMC is 
the Ideal Clicking Machine - Model C, which was adopted in 1908, ( 19 ) 
more than 40 years ago. Two other models for heavy duty work 
are of much less importance as shown in the following table. 
TABLE :ti 
USMC CLICKING MACHINES 
Machine Model Year Adopted Number Outstanding 
Ideal Clicking - C 
Ideal Clicking - F 
Ideal Clicking - G 








Source: Trial Brief of the United States, U~S. v. United Sho~ 
Machinery Corporation, Boston, Mass~, 1949. Part I n 2R 
( /~). 
( 17 ) • 
( 18). 
( Jl:f) • 
Ibid., p. 26. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 27. 
Ibid. , p. 28. 
• 
TABLE.l3 
ADOPTION DATE AND REVENUE It~ORTANCE 
OF USMC'S TEH MOST IMPORTANT MAJOR MACHINES 
Percent of USMC No. of Adoption 
USMC Total USMC percent of Machines Date of 
Revenue Machine Total Important Important 
Machine (000) Revenue Machines Models Models 
Lasting $4,306 19.36 94 10,169 1913-1928 
Outsole Stitching 2,908 13.07 92 3,532 1914 
Welt Sewing 2,222 9.99 97 1,445 1911 
Pulling Over 1,369 6.15 99 3,142 1910-1913 
Heel Attaching 1,347 6.05 93 1,555 1910 
Clicking 1,~58 5.66 97 15,915 1908 
Rough Rounding 719 3.23 98 1,429 1910 
Butsole Leveling 599 2.69 97 935 1922 
Cement Sole Attaching 577 2.59 40 
----
1932 
Outsole Laying 571 2.57 91 ( 518 ( 1922 ( 487 ( 1938 
Source: Adapted from Statistical Data of Trial Brief, u.s. v. United Shoe Machiner,r 
Corporation, Boston, Mass., May 2, 1949, Part I, pp. 24-25. 
...0 
C) 
From the table on the preceeding page it can be seen that 
about the same situation exists for m~ny of USMC's major 
machines. Next, it can be noted that USMC has control of over 
90 percent of the market for every major machine field except 
Cement Sole Attaching, and :0~-=~ Sti tchdown, Platform Cover and 
Pre-Welt Lasting machines. Finally,the adoption dates are seen 
to be comparatively recent for the machines where competition 
exists; but where USMC dominates the field the models are very 
old - often being adopted 30 or 40 .years ago. 
It is evident then that USMC has not made any effort to 
improve those machines where it has a virtual monopoly. An 
example of this can be secured from the files and reports on 
USMC Pulling Over·Machines. USMC's principal machines in this 
field are the very old Rex Pulling Over Machine - :ModelsC and 
D as shown in the following table. 
TABLE IZ-
USMC PULLING OVER 1~0HINES 
Machine Model 
Rex Pulling Over - C 
Rex Pulling Over - D 











Source: Trial Brief, U~S. v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation, Boston,Mass., May 2,1949, Part I,p. 38. 
in 1925 one,of_USMC's officials complained about the Rex 
machine stating: 
uour present.machine is still being built on the · 
old nucleus that was brought out 28 years ago. It is 
- probabl the worst conglomeration of atches and 
building condi tiona we have confronting us.~.in any of 
our machines. 0 (~o) 
Although these models were over thirty years old, USMC 
faced very little competition in the field, and in 1947 USMC had 
( )../ ) 
99 per cent of the market. In 1940 USMC reported some pro-
gress on an improved Pulling Over machine that would place USMC 
in a strong competitive position, but stated: 
•As we have considerable money invested in the 
3300 machines now qutstanding, which are performing 
very satisfactory work, we do not anticipate rapid 
commercialization of the new machine." (~~) 
Without the pressure of competition USMC felt that the need 
for commercializing a new machine was not urgent. 
From the evidence presented we may make some important 
conclusions. In the absence of competition and because of its 
strong control of the m.ark~t, USMC withholds improvements in 
its shoe machinery to•:protect i t;s investment in old machines. 
Since USMC receives a lucrative and stable revenue from its 
existing machines out on lease~ it is reluctant to displace any 
type of an old machine which are outstanding in large numbers. 
It seems that USMC does not wish to introduce new machinery 
which might tend to lessen the number of steps in the shoe 
making process or in any way reduce the amount and diversity of 
,the royalty charges it imposes under the leasing system. USMC 
has been able to enforce this policy upon the shoe trade by 
~eeping shoe manufacturers dependent upon its shoe machinery. 
( '-O). Ibid., p. 39. 
(~I) • Ibid. 
( 7.-l,). Ibid., .P• 40. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMJWARY AND CONCLUSIONS· 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
From the time of its formation in 1899 by the merger of the 
three major shoe machinery companies then in existence; the 
cKay Shoe Machinery Company, the Goodyear Shoe Machinery 
ompany, and the Consolidated & McKay Company; the United Shoe 
achinery Corporation has maintained a powerful business organi-
zation which dominates the shoe machinery industry. The princi-
::t:.machines which each of the independent companies featured wer 
closely tied up with one another in a link process of manufactur 
ing shoes, and formed the very important basis for securing con-
rol of and being able to offer a full line of shoe machinery. 
By acquiring the assets and personnel of its competitors, 
nforcing restrictive agreements with competitors and outside 
ompanies, and by the engrossment of patents pertaining to all 
ypes of shoe machinery, USMC has strengthened its control over 
he market for shoe machinery, so that it now has a virtual 
onopoly in this industry. 
Through its program of acquisitions USMC eliminated competi 
ors who had been engaged in a wide range of activities in the 
hoe machinery industry. It also acquired valuable assets con-
isting of patent rights, plant, equipment, machines, and skille 
er.vices, although many of the patents and machines so secured 
ave been shelved. As in the case of acquiring the Littleway 
recess, USMC was able to commercialize with considerable success 
ome of the shoe processes and machines, thus strengthening its 
rganization. Finally, by acquiring the patent rights and the 
line of machines from former competitors USMC has precluded thei~ 
being developed or commercialized by remaining competition; 
limiting these to very narrow fields. 
USMC has entered into a number of restrictive agreements 
through which it induced companies manufacturing shoe machinery 
or shoe repair machinery to confine their business to machines 
which did not interfere with USMC's field. Agreements also were 
made with othe~ companies by.which USMC became the agent for 
distributing shoe machinery not only in the United States, but 
also to an appreciable extent in foreign countries. 
Throughout USMC has maintained a price and production 
policy which has been instrumental in keeping its dominant 
position in the shoe machinery industry. 
USMC's price policy is concerned with several important 
objectives. One of these is to fight, restrict, eliminate, and 
forestall competition by an array of supplemental and coordina-
ted methods and practices. In order to restrict and eliminate 
competition USMC often revised its lease and sale terms on 
various shoe machines. At other times USMC developed new 
machines or made improvements on its existing machines, offering 
these at much lower rates than was customary in order to fight 
competition. To sustain the above actions USMC would make use 
of the large revenue it received from its machines that faced 
little if any competition. 
Of the many machines it produces, USMC receives 62 per cent 
of its annual revenue from a set of machines which perform only 
ten of the large number of operations in the shoe making process 
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USMC has a virtual monopoly on these machines and is able to 
price these so as to return maximum profits. This provides the 
means whereby USMC can maintain a complete line of auxiliary 
machines, some of which barely pay· their own way, or even incur 
a loss. In this way USMC'·s price policy implements another of 
its objectives, that of maintaining and distributing a full line 
of shoe machinery. There are many advantages which accrue to 
USMC by being completely integrated in carrying a full line of 
machinery. 
The most importap.t aspect of USMC's price policy is its 
utilization of thEi leasing and rental· system. This system 
characterizes the contractual use of most of its shoe machinery 
and forms an important basis for most of its prices, terms, and 
conditions under which its machines are used. Through the leas-
ing and rental system USMC secures an annual reverru.e which is 
seen to be remarkably stable and consistently returning an ex~ 
cellent net income each year. At a time when our country was 
~ndergoing serious economic disturbances, USMC's returns were 
just as good as ever. During the period 1924 through 1933 USMC 
averaged an annual net income of about eight million dollars, 
registering a high of ~~9,670,000 in 1930 and a low of $6,020,000 
in 1933. In the decade 1940-1949, USMC's annual revenue secured 
from the royalties, rentals, and license fees of its leasEid shoe 
~achinery ranged from a low of $19,100,000 in 1941 to $24,500,00( 
in 1949, .showing again a very stable level. For this same period 
~SMC's net income stayed within the limits of $7,500,000 earned 
in 1946 to $10,400,000 earned in 1942. 
Another of USMC's main objectives is to keep shoe manufact-
urers dependent upon USMC shoe machinery as much as possible. 
To this end USMC 1 s production policy is directed in an attempt 
to develop, manufacture and distibute a full line of machinery. 
USMC 1 s price policy is also related to this objective. The na-
ture of the shoe industry provides the setting for the methods 
and practices follow.ed by USMC in fixing its prices. In fact, 
it was because of the attitude of shoe makers and the structure 
of the shoe industry in the l860 1 s that led Colonel Gordon McKay 
to initiate the leasing and rental system. 
Modern shoe making is largely dependent upon the use of 
machinery. Their use results in labor saving and increased 
production. In order to compete successfully in the market, 
shoe manufacturers must u~ilize a variety of machines, most of 
which are produced by USMC. Shoes are made on the principle of 
one machine to each operation. This situation has been carefull 
fostered and maintained by USMC to force reliance of shoe makers 
upon USMC's products in as many ways as possible. 
Since abouf 1900 the noticeable improve~ents in shoe machin 
ery by USMC have resulteoc in a swifter device to accomplish the 
same operation that was once done by hand or a slower machine. 
There has been a decided lack of commercialization of macijines 
by USMC which will combine two or more of the hundreds of steps 
in the shoe making process. This practice forms an integral 
~art of USMC's ·production policy and has had important effects 
in determining and shaping the structure of the shoe machinery 
industry, as well as directly influencing shoe making methods. 
The shoe manufacturing industry has always been highly 
competitive with many small companies in the field. Thus organ~ 
ized resistance to USMC 1 s pricing methods have not materialized 
to any great extent. The ease of entry into the field, however, 
has been greatly facilitated by USMC's leasing and rental system 
Small companies are not ordinarily able to afford investing the 
necessary amount of capital in purchasing all the shoe machinery 
to begin production, but under the leasing and rental system 
these companies can secure the machinery to start business. 
Having established a production policy of manufacturing a 
full line of shoe machinery along with the spare parts which are 
in continual demand by shoe manufacturers under the requirements 
of USMC '~s lease contracts, USMC protects its control of the 
manufacture and distribution of most of its maEhines by maintain 
ing an extensive research division which operates in conjunction 
with USMC's patent department to secure wide patent coverage. 
The research division is continually engaged in the development 
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of various types of shoe machinery and is always ready to simula e 
and improve upon competitive shoe machines. 
In the cement shoe field, for example, the success of the 
Compo Shoe Machinery Company led USMC to initiate and carry 
through an active program whereby new and improved machines were 
put out with the terms and prices on them revised downwards 
considerably. The tactics used by USMC in meeting and attempti~ 
to restrict the competition offered by the Compo Company provide 
a very good example of the pattern of activity followed by USMC 
in dealing with most of its competitors. 
I 
The most interesting segment of USMC's business organizatio 
is its staff of roadmen. The reports of these roadmen, which ar 
known as OMIR's(Outside Machine Installation Reports), are re-
sponsible for a great deal of detailed, accurate information 
upon competitive installations in shoe factories. USMC employs 
some 900 of these roadmen whose normal function is the repair of 
USMC machines, but they are also required to detect and report 
upon all instances of installations and removals of competitive 
machines in the shoe factories to which they are assigned as 
well as the circumstances of the use of such machinery. USMC's 
higher management uses these reports as the basis for determinin 
what action will be ·taken to meet or eliminate such competition. 
One of the ways in which USMC seeks to cause the withdrawal of 
competitive machines is by the threat of a patent infringement 
suit. Many small competitors are unable to afford the expense 
of a court battle and so they vuluntarily come to terms with USM • 
In order to protect its business of manufacturing and dis-
tributing a full line of shoe machinery, USMC has built up a 
vast and complex patent structure engrossing the rights to pro-
duce a wide variety of machines and improvements relating to sho 
machinery. By this means USMC has been successful in excluding 
competitors from the market for such machinery. Although USMC 
has secured a large number of patents for new ~achines and im-
provements, it has not followed the practice of developing them 
rapidly or commercializing them except when competition threaten • 
Of the 3,777 patents acquired by USMC since 1930, 2729 are paper 
patents which USMC has not commercialized to any extent. 
In 1947 of the 554 machine models put out by USMC, 462 were 
in use before 1930, while £12 were adopted since 1930. These 92 
models were covered by only 363 of the 3,777 patents secured by 
USMC since 1930~ So less than ten per cent of USMC 1 s patents 
for this period have been commercialized by new models. 
J. I\1. Clark, in his book "Alternative to Serfdom11 , suggests 
the compulsory licensing of all patents issued on inventions and 
technological improvements to insure their being commercialized. 
t is generally agreed that our patent system is antique and 
outmoded, and is one of the contributing factors to USMC's 
production policy of shelving improvements upon shoe machinery. 
ne of the important aspects of the functioning of USMC•s 
research division is its withholding of new machines and improve 
from the market until such a time as the need arises for 
introduction because of competitive necessity. USMC 1 s 
esearch activity,therefare, is stimulated or retarded according 
existence of competitive activity as reported by its ro 
Economic theory from the approach of monopolistic or imper-
competition has·made much progress in analyzing and expla 
ng modern business methods and.practices, and deals more effec 
vely with the structure of capitalistic industry as it exists 
However, because of the assumptions necessary to support 
logical system of much of these theories, and because of the 
ee of abstraction necessary to make the theories complete, 
be applied directly in most cases for a clear under-
tanding of the nature of the business or indust 
• 
Schumpeter's description and analysis of monopolistic 
practices in his book »capitalism, Socialism,.and Democracy», 
has many relevant points when compared to the activities and 
policies of USMC and the shoe machinery industry. Schumpeter 
points out that the threat of new technologies considerably 
reduces the scope and importance of practices that aim, through 
restricting output, at conserving established positions and ·at 
maximizing the profits accruing from them. Restrictive practice~ 
of this kind play a part in the policy of creative destruction, 
as Schumpeter puts it, and are employed to stabilize the busines~ 
and alleviate difficulties. When a business resorts to protect-
ing devices as patents or in lonE-period contracts secured in 
advance, it is engaging in safe-guarding activities which aim 
to reduce the risk of investment and become an element of costs. 
The result of this is a price policy that makes it possible to 
write off inves~ents more quickly than would otherwise be 
possible in order to provide excess capacity to be used for 
aggression or defense. 
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Appendix - A 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Active Competition--represents the shoe machines of those 
companies which compete with USMC and were in business in 
1947. 
Adopted--when USMC establishes terms v.pon a new machine, this 
signifies that it has been officially adopted, and it then 
becomes ready for distribution. The terms committee 
recommends adoption of specific terms after receiving 
proposals from the operating departments. After the terms 
are approved, they are entered in US:MC's Terms Books and 
circularized to the shoe trade. 
Cement Shoe--are those shoes in which the leather outsole is 
attached to the insole and upper by adhesive cement. 
Unlike the other types of sole attaching by stitching or 
.tacking, the soles of cement shoes are permanently attached 
in the first operation. After the shoe has been lasted, 
the outsole and shoe bottom are roughed by a machine with a 
wire brush. Then a coat of cement is applied to both the 
shoe bottom and the outsole. The cement is allowed to dry 
and then the outsole cement is activated, after which the 
shoe and the sole are placed together under pressure in the 
sole attaching machine. 
Cement Sole Attaching Machine--See cement shoe above. 
Clicking Machine--performs the major shoe operation known as 
upper cutting. Makes use of dies which vary with the 
nature of the cutting to be done. 
Dinking--an alternative name for cutting press machines. Cuts 
the bottom· stock of the shoe, principally outsoles and 
insoles. Shoe manufacturers preparing their own soles use 
cutting presses which force a shaped die of the desired 
size through the leather. 
Fighting Machine--designates shoe machinery distributed by USMC 
for the primary purpose of replacing or preventing the 
installation of competitive machines. The prices and terms 
of these machines are often revised to fight competition. 
!Finishing l'.'lachine--used to smooth and clean the shoe as a final 
operation making a finished product. 
FUll Capacity Clause--one of the provisions in USMC's standard 
lease contracts under which the lessee agrees to use an 
USMC machine to the full extent of which J:J,.is production 
I 
Heel Attach~~ Machine--performs the operation of attaching a 
variety of kinds and types of heels used in making modern 
shoes. The several different kinds of heel attaching 
machinery include leather and rubber heel attaching, wood 
heel nailing and wood heel attaching machines. 
Homemade Machines--these machines are innovated and built 
expressly for the use of the shoe manufacturer who either 
builds them in his own factory or has a local mechanic or 
machinist do the job for him. These machines are not sold 
or distributed to other shoe manufacturers. 
Inactive Competition--represents the shoe machines of those 
companies who were once active in the shoe machinery 
industry, but who are out of business by 1947. 
Infringing Machine--a machine that is found to be a duplicate or 
close approJr:imation of that already covered by a patent of 
a competing shoe machinery company. 
Inseam Trimming Machine--all Goodyear Welt shoes require inseam 
trimming. This machine removes the surplus stock of the 
upper, lining, box toe, insole and counter below the inseam 
after the welt has been attached to the upper and the rib 
of the insole. 
LastingMachine--performs one of the most important steps in 
shoe making. After the upper of a shoe is stretched over 
the last by a pulling over machine, a lasting machine then 
draws the upper over the last, fits its snugly to the 
profile of the last, and affixes it to the insole. The 
last is usually a wooden model of the human foot. 
Littleway Process--see page 15 this thesis. 
Ma,jor Machine--one of the machines performing the necessary and 
most important operations in the shoe making process. IJiajo 
machines are classified into 18 different fields by USMC. 
See table on page 39 of this thesis. 
Minor Machine--performs an auxiliary function to a major machine, 
or else is used on a comparatively unimportant operation. 
Outsole Stitching Machine--used in the method of attaching 
outsoles on Goodyear Welt, Stituhdown, :McKay Welt and Pre-
Welt. This machine has a curved needle and places the sole 
attaching seam on the outside of the shoe. 
Paper Patent--e. patent secured by USMC on a shoe machine or an 
improvement which is not commercialized, but either 
developed very slowly or not at all. 
II 
~~~====~~~~~~~~--performs' one of the major steps in 
c e upper to the shape of the la$t on which the 
shoe is made. The pulling over operation and the 
subsequent lasting operations impart the desired style and 
fit characteristics to the finished shoe. 
dman--see Appendix - B. 
-a payment for the use of a leased shoe machine. These 
payments are based either upon the number of pairs of shoes 
processed by the machine or else upon the number of 
operations performed upon the shoe. In most cases the 
royalty amounts to a fraction of a cent per pair of shoes 
or per unit of operation. 
lved--a term used to indicate that a shoe machine or a patent 
upon shoe machinery has wither been put to one side and not 
commercialized or else is developed purposely slowly to 
retard its commercialization. 
Machine--a shoe machine that is held in readiness for ~~~~~~~~~~~ 
use a s e manufacturer in the event his regular machine 
breaks down or his production schedule overloads the 
capacity of the regular machine. 
titchdown Method--a method of lasting the shoe. Stitchdown 
shoes are sted with either thread, cement, or staples. 
Thread lasting has all but completely replaced staple 
lasti'ng on most stitchdown shoes. 
1~::.::..:::...=..;=;;,.;.._.;;..:::.:;:a~u:.=s..;::;e-.-one of the standard clauses in USMC r s lease 
s. Under this clause the lessee of a shoe machine 
agrees to return the USMC's machine at the expiration of 
the lease in good working order, reimbursing USMC for all 
broken or outworn parts, and also paying USMC a specified 
sum of money upon the return of the machine. 
n Clause--a business practice followed by USMC from 1901 
to by shoe manufacturers were compelled to take a 
group of machines comprising at least one basic machine and 
accessory machines even though the shoe maker desired only 
an accessory machine. 
-denotes the basis upon which the shoe manufacturer 
w 1 pay USMC for the use of its machine. By this 
arrangement the shoe manufacturer pays a royalty based upon 
the number of pairs of shoes he produces with the use of 
the machine or the number of operations performed by it. 
~~~~~~~~P~r~~~--the most important operation on a Goodyear 
hoe. It attaches .a welt through the upper of the 






USMC's Roadmen and Their Reports 
·USMC maintains district branch offices located in the 
various shoe manufacturing centers of the United States. Under 
the Department of Agencies USMC t s Operating Departments supervis1 
the branch offices in the d~stribution and servicing of shoe 
. !machinery. Each branch office is headed by a District Manager 
and is staffed by roadmen and salesmen. The roadmen are 
trained by the Operating Departments. 
USMC employs approximately 900 roadmen to perform the norma: 
function 9f servicing machines, and also to carry out the very 
important task of keeping a careful watch for installations of 
competitive shoe machines in the factories which they service. 
Since USMC 1 s machines are to be found in practically every shoe 
factory in the United States its roadmen have access to all of 
these plants by virtue of the reservations in US:MC• s leases whicl 
gives USMC the right of entry into the factory of its lessees to 
~eep its leased machines in working order! USMC's leases also 
~equire that the lessees must purchase all machine replacement 
parts from USMC and to pay machine rentals calculated so as to 
( I ) 
include repair service charges. Hence the lessees are forced 
to invite USMC•s roadmen into the;i:.r factories for the purpose of 
fr>epairing defective USMC machines. 
(I ). Defendant's Answer to the Comilaint, United States v. 
P"nited Shoe Machinery Corporation,Boston,ass.,May 27,1948,p.335; 
I 
II/ 
USMC's roadmen are instructed to observe, make notes,and 
prepare written reports of all pertinent information concerning 
the installation and removal ., operation,and performance of the 
competitive machines in the shoe factories which they service. 
The detail, extent, and accurate coverage of these reports is 
amazing. They are considered to be very reliable reports. 
. . ( ~) 
These reports are known as ffi£[R's and are sent to Boston to 
the Shoe Process and Shoe Construction Department of USMC which 
distributes the information to USMC's officers and certain 
departments. Copies of these O:MIR's are distributed to the 
Research Division, the Patent Department,and the interested 
( .3 ) 
Operating-department. 
The information thus received is used as a basis for 
determining what actions;· if -any, should be taken in regard to 
the competitive installation. If a program of action is 
adopted then the roadmen.are instructed to make periodic check-
ups upon the installation in the shoe factory originally 
involved, and if necessary ,in many other sh.oe factories, in or 
to trace the success or failure of USMC's program in effecting ( t ) 
removals of competitive machinery. 
Some interesting instances of the activities of these 
roadmen are given by the Department of Justice in its case 
against USMC. The observations of competitive installations is 
not confined to routine factory calls. Eavesdropping was 
Outside Machine Installation Reports • 
• . Trial Brief, Part I, op. cit., pp. 13.-14. 
• Ibid. • 405. 
.fl' 
utilized by one USMC representative to secure information ( s) . 
regarding a competitor. The 11 amiable11 mood prevailing at a 
social affair was sought to be converted to advantage by 
(' ) 
another member of USMC's staff. In another instance the fact 
that a competitive machine was kept in a locker room proved no 
great deterrent to the roadman interested in it. He secured 
information about it "through another source". 
So it can be seen,that.the roadmen were zealous and 
perspicacious in their efforts to obtain complet·e information 
about all competitive machines. It is no wonder that the file 
of OMIR 1 s kept by the USMC is considered to be one of the main 
gears in the functioning of its complex and highly organized 
business operations. The Department of Justice also realized 
the importance and reliability of these OMIR's. Consequently, 
it has based much of the analysis and details of its case 
against the ·USMllJ upon these reports. 1'/luch of the statistical 
data, facts and excerpts stated in its trial brief have been 
gathered from the m:IIR 's made available to it by court order·. 
Therefore the original source for some of the material of 
this thesis comes from the OMIR's of USMC's roadmen. Other 
~asic sources used by the Department of Justice for information, 
facts and opinions about USMC and its policies are the Annual 
!Reports prepared by the heads of USiviC's various departments, 
!Program Committee Reports, Terms Committee Reports, and USMC's 
(5). 
( &, ) • Ibid., p. 406. Ibid. 
• 
vt 
Answer to the Complaint of the Department of Justice in the 
District Cow;rt of United States for the District of Mass., 
Boston, Mass., May 27, 1848. 
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ABSTRACT 
PRICE AND PRODUCTION POLICY OF THE 
UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION 
I~ is ~he purpose of.this thesis to presen~ and analyze those 
aspects of the organization, manufacturing and marketing activities 
of ~he United Shoe Machinery Corporation, together with the char-
acter and extent of its competition, which have a bearing on its 
price and production polic.y. Since the activities of the Uni~ed 
Shoe Machinery Corporation in a very large part determine the 
structure: of the shoe machinery industry, it is hoped that this 
thesis will ma~e some contribution towards an understanding of 
that industry, especially as an example of the setting for the 
operation of a fairly advanced form of.monopoly. 
In preparing th~s thesis a great deal of research was done 
in the evidence presented by the Department of Justice of .the U.S. 
Government in the trial briefs of its suit against the United Shoe 
Machinery Corporation under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in the 
District Court of Massachusetts, May 2, 1949. The author was 
fortunate in having the oppor~unity to discuss many of the more 
important sections of the trial briefs and the reports contained 
within it with those members of the staff of the Department of 
Justice in Boston, Mass., who had prepared them. Several booklets, 
put out by the United Shoe Machinery Corporation, including the 
one entitled "How Modern Shoes Are Made", were used as references 
on the art of shoemaking and the various machines employed in the 
shoemaking process. Harold Quimby's "'Pacemakers of Progressn and 
Edgar M. Hoover's 11 Location Theory and the Shoe Industry*' were 
helpful sources for mB.!lY deta-ils regarding the relation between 
the shoe trad~ and the shoe machinery industry. 
In the shoe machinery field the United Shoe Machinery C~rpor­
ation has attained such a dominant position that is equalled by 
few other business concerns in the United States. It secured its 
initial strong control o~ the manufacture and distribution of shoe 
machinery with the merger of the Goodyear, McKay, and the Consoli-
dated & McKay shoe mach~nery companies in 1899, and has maintained 
.it zealously ever since. The principal machines which each of the 
independent companies featured were closely tied up with one 
another in a link process of manufacturing shoes, and so formed an 
important ba.sis for securing control of the business for a full 
line of shoe machines. 
I 
Since that ti~e one important aspect of United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation's business policy has been to strengthen its position 
by a program of acquisitions. from which it has derived many advan-
tages and benefits. By acquiring the assets and personnel of its 
competitors, enforcing restrictive ~greements with competitors, and 
outside companies, and by thevengrossment of patents pertaining to 
all. types of shoe machinery, this corporation has secured a virtual 
monopoly in the shoe machinery industry. Throughout the United 
Shoe Machinery Corporation has maintained a price and production 
policy which has been instrumental in maintaining its dominant 
position in its field. 
The price policy of this corporation is concerned with several 
important objectives. -bo One of these is meet and forestall competi-
A 
tion by an array of supplemental and coordinated methods and prac-
tices. The United Shoe Machinery Corporation has:often revised its 
lease and sale terms on vgious shoe machines in·order· to restrict 
and eliminate competition. At other times new machines were devel-
oped or improvements made on existing machines, and thesa were 
offered at much lower rates than was customary in order to fight 
competition. To sustain such ~ctions the United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation makes use of the large revenue it receives from its 
most important machines where it faces little if any competition. 
Th~s corporation has a virtual monopoly on the major machines used 
in the manufacture of shoes and is able to price them so as to 
secure maximum profits. This provides the means whereby a complete 
line of auxiliary machines can be maintaine~ some of which barely 
pay their way, or even incur a losa. In this way such a price 
policy implements another objec.tive, that of maintaining and dis-· 
tributing a ful~ line of shoe machinery, from which many advan-
·_:, -· .. 
tage$ areGsecured .. 
At present most of the competitive machines and companies are 
able to offer but fringe competition. The major exception occurs 
in the cement shoe field where the Compo Shoe Machinery Company was 
able to initiate a success£ul machine for a cementing pr&~ess that 
has gained much headway since 1930. Even here, after a late start 
the United Shoe Machinery Corporation has succ eed.e4.!in capturing· 
over fifty per cent of the business. 
The most important aspect of the United Shoe Machinery Corpor-
ation's price policy is its utilization of the leasing and rental 
system. The leasing system for shoe machinery was originated by 
Colonel Gordon McKay in the 1860's, and it has since been ad.opted 
by ali the major shoe machinery companies. This syst.em forms the 
basis for most of the prices, terms, and conditions under which the 
shoe machines of the United Shoe Machinery Corporation are used, 
Its annual revenue from shoe machinery is secured mainly from this 
source, and has proven to be remarkably stable and consistent, 
returning an excellent net income each year. 
Another important factor which influences the price policy of 
the United Shoe Machinery Corporation is the· dependence of shoe. 
manufacturers upon its machines. This situation has been care-
ful~y fostered by this corporation. It arose because of the highly 
competitive nature ofthe shoe -industry, and the existence of a 
large number-of small companies inthe·field. Many of these small 
companies were able to continue or even to start business only 
because of the leasing system ... 
The main objectives of the production policy of the United 
Shoe Machinery Corporation are the manufacture and distribution 
of a full l~ne of shoe machinery and accessories, and the produc-
tion of a large stock of spare parts to replace those which are 
worn out, broken, or lost in its machines leased out to shoe fac-
tories. These objectives~as well as those of its price policy1 are 
aided immeasurably by the maintenance of a large research division, 
which not only develops new machinery and improvsments, but also 
provides the means whereby the United Shoe Machinery Corporation. 
can secure extensive patent protection for its existing machinery, 
much of which is quite antiquated in origin. A large and competent 
staff of patent attorneys are employed to work in conjunction with 
the research division and the operating departments of this corpor-
ation. Most interesting are the activities of the staff of roadmen 
employed by this corporation ostensibly to repair shoe machinery in 
shoe factoriea, but whose reports, known as OMIR's, are used as the 
. -basis for action byhigher·mariagement against competitive shoe 
machines and. competing shoe machinery·companies. 
